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November 14, 2025

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Re: Implementation of Nevada Senate Bill 157 and LCB File No. R152-24 -  
Constitutional, Scientific, and Regulatory Deficiencies in Cannabis Testing  
Requirements

Dear Ms. Cronkhite,

Attached to this correspondence is a comprehensive review and analysis of Nevada Senate Bill 157 and LCB File No. R152-24 ("The Brief") for the CCB's review. The Brief has been approved by the following laboratories: 374 Labs, LLC, G3 Labs, LLC, MA and Associates, LLC, ERP, LLC, NV Cann Labs, LLC, RSR Analytical Laboratories, and DPL Nevada LLC dba Digipath Labs. The foregoing laboratories request you take the Brief into consideration when evaluating the implementation of SB 157 and LCB File No. R152-24.

In addition to the Brief, I have attached an executive summary as well. The Nevada laboratories look forward to working with the CCB through the issues identified in the Brief. Please include the Brief and Executive Summary in the materials for the upcoming workshop next week.

Sincerely,

*Adam Fulton*

Adam R. Fulton, Esq.

# Executive Summary

Nevada Senate Bill 157 and LCB File No. R152-24

*Constitutional, Scientific, and Regulatory Deficiencies in Cannabis Testing Requirements*

November 13, 2025

## Overview

Nevada Senate Bill 157 and the proposed Cannabis Compliance Board regulation R152-24 present critical deficiencies across constitutional, scientific, and regulatory domains. This analysis documents how Multi-State Operators orchestrated a coordinated campaign to capture Nevada's cannabis testing framework after the CCB rejected their September 2024 petition on scientific and safety grounds. The evidence reveals systematic manipulation across three fronts—the CCB, Nevada Legislature, and ASTM International—to increase testing lot sizes from 5 to 15 pounds while eliminating meaningful state oversight.

## Critical Findings

### Constitutional Violations

**Unprecedented Delegation:** R152-24 and SB 157 require that testing standards "must align with the most current version" of ASTM D8334/D8334M, creating automatic adoption of future private standards without state review. This violates Nevada's private nondelegation doctrine established in *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

**Absence of State Oversight:** Unlike traditional Nevada practice of adopting specific versions of external standards with amendment authority, SB 157 provides no mechanism for CCB to review, reject, or modify ASTM changes before automatic incorporation into Nevada law.

**Moving Target Problem:** ASTM Workshop WK94344 was initiated March 29, 2025—just 48 hours after SB 157 passed the Nevada Senate—to "remove the 15lb max batch size." This creates an unknowable standard that cannot be legally enforced or complied with.

### Scientific Inadequacy

**Statistical Invalidity:** Currently proposed sampling protocols for 15-pound lots achieve only 0.29% effective sampling rates versus the required 0.88%, resulting in statistical power of 0.21 (versus required 0.80) and confidence of 51% (versus required 95%). This renders testing scientifically meaningless under ISO/IEC 17025:2017 standards.

**Measurement Uncertainty Explosion:** For 15-pound lots, measurement uncertainty reaches  $\pm 102\%$  at the 68% confidence level, meaning cannabis tested at 20% THC could be reported anywhere from negative values to over 40% THC. This violates fundamental scientific principles and ISO accreditation requirements.

**Critical Homogenization Failure:** The currently proposed practice would collect 60 grams but divides into three 20-gram portions and homogenizes only one portion, dropping the effective sampling rate from 0.88% to 0.29%. Proper practice requires homogenizing the full 60-gram sample representing 0.88% of the lot before subdivision.

## **Public Health Consequences**

**Aspergillus Detection Failure:** With currently proposed protocols, 91% of dangerous Aspergillus contamination in 15-pound lots goes undetected, versus 79% with proper sampling. This fungal pathogen causes invasive pulmonary aspergillosis in immunocompromised patients, including those undergoing chemotherapy or organ transplantation.

**Potency Labeling Crisis:** Under this proposed standard THC measurement uncertainty of  $\pm 17.4$  percentage points for 15-pound lots means cannabis tested at 20% THC could be reported from 2.6% to 37.4% at the 95% confidence level, violating Nevada's labeling requirements and endangering consumers who rely on accurate potency information.

## **Evidence of Regulatory Capture**

**Failed CCB Petition:** On September 19, 2024, the CCB rejected a Multi-State Operator petition to increase lot sizes to 50 pounds, citing insufficient scientific evidence and public health concerns. Rather than returning with better evidence as suggested, the MSO immediately pivoted to the legislature.

**Coordinated Timeline:** March 27, 2025: SB 157 passed the Nevada Senate with original language referencing "ASTM D8334-20" (2020 version). March 29, 2025: ASTM Workshop WK94344 initiated by an MSO employee who serves as ASTM D37.02 Subcommittee Chair to "remove the 15lb max batch size." April 24, 2025: Amendment 741 changes SB 157 language to "most current version," creating automatic adoption of unknown future ASTM standards. May 29, 2025: SB 157 passed the Assembly and was signed into law in June 2025 with its automatic adoption mechanism.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The MSO employee who serves as technical contact for ASTM Workshop WK94344 is simultaneously the MSO's Quality Director and the technical contact for the workshop to remove the 15 pound lot size limitation. ASTM D37 Vice-Chair Dave Vaillencourt who operates The GMP Collective is marketing "ASTM Standards Development" services for \$3,000, creating financial incentives to develop industry-friendly standards.

**Automatic Adoption Mechanism:** R152-24 Section 61 introduces a 30-day automatic approval provision where "silence equals consent," fundamentally reversing normal regulatory review and effectively transferring Nevada's authority to a private organization controlled by industry employees and consultants.

# Understanding the Statistical Requirements

## The 0.88% Sampling Rate Requirement

Cannabis testing requires approximately 62 independent observations to achieve 95% confidence with a 5% margin of error. Because cannabis material is not perfectly homogeneous, a design effect of 2-3 accounts for non-independence, requiring a 0.88% sampling rate to maintain acceptable statistical precision.

This rate must scale proportionally with lot size to maintain constant precision:

5-pound lots: 20 grams per testing event (0.88% of 2,268g)

10-pound lots: 40 grams per testing event (0.88% of 4,536g)

15-pound lots: 60 grams per testing event (0.88% of 6,804g)

The CCB recognized this 0.88% requirement when they finalized the proposed change to NCCR Regulations 11.050 3 in the May 2024 version for submission to the LCB changing the required sample size to 20 grams for each 5 pound lot.

## The Critical Homogenization Requirement

*The most commonly misunderstood aspect of proper cannabis testing is the homogenization requirement.* The entire sample representing 0.88% of the lot must be homogenized together before subdivision for testing, retesting, and retention.

**Currently Proposed Flawed Practice:** Collect 60 grams, divide into three 20-gram portions, homogenize only one 20-gram portion. Result: Effective sampling rate drops to 0.29% ( $20g \div 6,804g$ ), producing statistically meaningless results.

**Required Scientific Practice:** Collect 180 grams total ( $3 \times 60g$ ), homogenize each entire 60-gram portion together before analysis. Result: Effective sampling rate maintains 0.88% ( $60g \div 6,804g$ ), producing statistically valid results.

**The Deck-Shuffling Analogy:** You cannot divide a deck of cards into three piles, shuffle only one pile, and expect cards drawn from that pile to represent the entire deck. Cannabis testing requires the same principle: homogenize the entire 0.88% sample, then subdivide for testing.

## Statutory Authority for Proper Sampling

**"Not Less Than" Language:** SB 157 uses the phrase "not less than" nine times, establishing minimums while explicitly preserving CCB authority to require larger scientifically justified samples. No maximum sample size is specified anywhere in SB 157 or ASTM D8334.

**ASTM Jurisdictional Precedence:** ASTM D8334 Section 1.2 explicitly states: "Where procedural aspects of this practice differ from local regulatory or jurisdictional requirements, the local regulatory or jurisdictional authority's directives shall take precedence." This confirms CCB's authority to exceed ASTM minimums.

**NRS 233B.040 Authority:** Nevada law grants agencies authority to adopt "reasonable regulations" that are "necessary to the proper execution" of assigned functions, explicitly allowing CCB to exceed statutory minimums when scientifically justified for public health protection.



# Comprehensive Recommendations

## Immediate Actions Required

- 1. Compel Testimony:** The CCB should require the MSO employee who serves as ASTM D37.02 Subcommittee Chair to testify under oath regarding: (a) the timeline for initiating ASTM Workshop WK94344 on March 29, 2025, just 48 hours after SB 157 passed the Senate; (b) her multiple roles as MSO Quality Director and ASTM committee officer; and (c) coordination with MSO management, Senator Flores's office, or others involved in SB 157's passage.
- 2. Independent ASTM Verification:** Call independent ASTM officials to testify regarding standard workshop procedures, conflict of interest policies for committee members employed by regulated entities, and whether Saturday workshop initiations are common practice.
- 3. Reject Automatic Adoption:** Remove R152-24 Section 61's automatic approval provision. Adopt ASTM D8334-20 (2020 version) by reference as was proposed in the CCB's 'Proposed changes to NCCR Regulations 5,7, and 11" in the May 2024 version at 11.025\_1\_ (f) and require affirmative CCB approval through formal rulemaking before any subsequent ASTM revisions become effective under Nevada law.
- 4. Maintain the CCB's conflict resolution provision** providing "guidance" found in the May 2024 proposed NCCR Regulations 5,7, and 11" in the May 2024 version at 11.025\_1\_ (g).

## Regulatory Safeguards

**Conflict of Interest Disclosure:** Require mandatory disclosure of ASTM committee membership, employer relationships, and financial interests for anyone testifying on technical standards. Prohibit testimony from ASTM committee officers who market "ASTM Standards Development" consulting services.

**Independent Scientific Review:** Create an independent scientific advisory panel to review proposed ASTM changes, evaluate scientific evidence, conduct independent statistical analysis, and assess public health implications before CCB adoption.

**Public Notice and Comment:** Establish minimum 60-day notice periods for proposed ASTM adoptions, public hearings for testing laboratories and consumer advocates, written findings documenting scientific basis, and economic impact analysis.

## Scientific Requirements for Valid Testing

**Implement Proper Sampling:** Require complete testing programs with proper homogenization: 5-pound lots need 60 grams total ( $3 \times 20g$ ); 10-pound lots need 120 grams total ( $3 \times 40g$ ); 15-pound lots need 180 grams total ( $3 \times 60g$ ).

**Mandate Proper Homogenization:** Explicitly require that the entire sample representing 0.88% of the lot be homogenized together before subdivision for testing, retesting, and retention. Currently proposed practice of subdividing first, then homogenizing only a portion, produces statistically meaningless results.

**Establish Scaled Requirements:** Adopt regulations specifying that sample sizes must scale proportionally with lot size to maintain constant 0.88% sampling rate and statistical validity across all lot sizes.

**Monitor Public Health Outcomes:** Track detection rates for microbial contamination, potency measurement accuracy, and consumer safety incidents to validate testing protocol effectiveness.

## **Conclusion**

The evidence compiled in this analysis demonstrates that Nevada's cannabis testing framework suffers from fundamental constitutional, scientific, and procedural deficiencies. What Multi-State Operators could not achieve through proper regulatory channels—rejection by the CCB on September 19, 2024—they achieved through legislative engineering and ASTM standards capture.

The timing is irrefutable: an MSO employee serves as the Technical Contact for the ASTM Workshop WK94344 which was initiated to "remove the 15lb max batch size" on Saturday March 29, 2025, just 48 hours after SB 157 passed the Nevada Senate. Amendment 741 subsequently changed the statutory language from "ASTM D8334-20" to "most current version," creating automatic adoption of whatever this industry-controlled ASTM committee produces.

The scientific evidence is unambiguous: the currently proposed sampling protocols render testing statistically meaningless. For 15-pound lots, measurement uncertainty reaches  $\pm 102\%$ , statistical power drops to 0.21 (versus required 0.80), and 91% of dangerous *Aspergillus* contamination goes undetected. These are not minor technical deficiencies—they represent complete testing failure.

**The Cannabis Compliance Board faces a critical choice: implement scientifically defensible requirements that actually protect public health, or continue the illusion of safety that industry wrote for itself.** Nevada has an opportunity to lead by implementing the nation's first truly scientific cannabis testing program. The alternative—continuing with statistically invalid testing that lets 91% of dangerous contamination pass undetected—is both scientifically indefensible and ethically unacceptable.

The MSOs successfully maneuvered the legislature into outsourcing Nevada law to their own employee. The question now is whether the CCB will fulfill its statutory duty to protect public health, or whether it will rubber-stamp whatever industry wants while pretending to provide consumer safety.

# Comprehensive Analysis of Nevada Senate Bill 157 and LCB File No. R152-24

## Constitutional, Scientific, and Regulatory Deficiencies in Cannabis Testing Requirements

A Comprehensive Review Integrating:  
Constitutional Law • Statistical Methodology • Regulatory Capture Evidence  
Implementation Frameworks • Administrative Procedure Requirements

November 12, 2025

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## **Executive Summary**

Nevada Senate Bill 157 (2025) and LCB File No. R152-24 present significant constitutional and technical challenges that warrant serious consideration prior to implementation. This comprehensive analysis documents critical deficiencies across multiple domains: constitutional law, statistical methodology, regulatory procedure, and public health protection. The evidence reveals a coordinated campaign to circumvent regulatory oversight through simultaneous manipulation of state legislation and private technical standards, creating unprecedented delegation of state regulatory authority to industry representatives.

## **Critical Findings**

1. **Constitutional Violation:** SB 157's requirement that testing standards "must align with" ASTM D8334/D8334M without state review authority represents unprecedented delegation of legislative power to a private organization, likely violating Nevada's private nondelegation doctrine as established in *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
2. **Scientific Inadequacy:** Current sampling requirements are statistically meaningless. For 15-pound lots, effective sampling rates of only 0.29% (versus required 0.88%) result in 91% of dangerous *Aspergillus* contamination going undetected and measurement uncertainty exceeding 100%, rendering results scientifically invalid under ISO/IEC 17025:2017 standards.
3. **Regulatory Capture:** Documentary evidence suggests that Multi-state Operators (MSO) orchestrated a coordinated campaign across three institutional fronts—the Cannabis Compliance Board (CCB), Nevada Legislature, and ASTM International—to dramatically increase cannabis testing lot sizes from 5 pounds to 15 pounds after the CCB rejected their petition on September 19, 2024, citing insufficient scientific evidence.
4. **Timeline Evidence of Coordination:** an MSO employee, the MSO's Quality Director and ASTM D37.02 Subcommittee Chair, serves as the technical contact for ASTM Workshop WK94344 to "remove the 15lb max batch size" which was initiated on Saturday, March 29, 2025—just 48 hours after SB 157 passed the Nevada Senate. This timing, combined with Amendment 741's subsequent change to "most current version" language, reveals deliberate orchestration to automatically incorporate new, unknown ASTM standard changes into Nevada law.
5. **Conflicts of Interest:** ASTM D37 Vice-Chair Dave Vaillencourt operates The GMP Collective, a consulting firm explicitly marketing "ASTM Standards Development and Benchmarking" services to cannabis operators for \$3,000, creating financial incentives to develop industry-friendly standards that reduce compliance costs.
6. **Automatic Adoption Mechanism:** CCB draft regulation R152-24 Section 61 introduces a 30-day automatic approval provision where "silence equals consent," fundamentally reversing

normal regulatory review processes and effectively transferring Nevada's regulatory authority to a private standards organization controlled by industry employees and consultants. This remedy is insufficient and fails to achieve its intended goal.

7. Statutory Interpretation Authority: Both SB 157 and ASTM D8334 explicitly establish minimums using "not less than" language nine times, providing clear legal authority for CCB to require larger scientifically justified samples. ASTM D8334 Section 1.2 explicitly states: "local regulatory or jurisdictional authority's directives shall take precedence."
8. R152-24 Procedural Irregularities: The November 20, 2025 regulatory hearing reveals that R152-24 was substantially rewritten after SB 157's passage (comparing June 2024 version vs. August 2025 version), appearing to bypass normal administrative procedures while implementing automatic adoption mechanisms for private standards developed by organizations with regulatory capture concerns.

## Public Health Consequences

The scientific deficiencies create immediate threats to consumer safety:

- Microbial Detection Failure: Only 12% probability of detecting 5% *Aspergillus* contamination in 15-pound lots using currently proposed practice (versus 31% with proper sampling), meaning 88% of dangerous fungal contamination affecting immunocompromised patients goes undetected.
- THC Measurement Crisis: Measurement uncertainty of  $\pm 17.4\%$  for 15-pound lots means cannabis tested at 20% THC could be reported anywhere from 16.5% to 23.5%, violating labeling requirements and endangering consumers who rely on accurate potency information while defrauding those who 'overpay' for THC.
- Statistical Invalidity: Statistical power of 0.21 (versus required 0.80) and statistical confidence of 51% (versus required 95%) render current testing scientifically meaningless, jeopardizing laboratories' ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation.

## The Critical Homogenization Misunderstanding

The most commonly misunderstood aspect of proper cannabis testing is the homogenization requirement. Currently proposed industry practice collects adequate material but fails to homogenize the entire sample together before subdivision, destroying statistical validity.

Flawed currently proposed practice: Collect 60 grams from 15-pound lot, divide into three 20-gram portions, homogenize only one 20-gram portion for testing. Result: Effective sampling rate drops to 0.29% ( $20g \div 6,804g$ ), producing statistically meaningless results.

Required scientific practice: Collect 180 grams total ( $3 \times 60g$ ), homogenize entire 60-gram testing portion together before analysis, maintain separate 60-gram portions for retesting and retention. Result: Effective sampling rate maintains 0.88% ( $60g \div 6,804g$ ), producing statistically valid results.

The deck-shuffling analogy: You cannot divide a deck of cards into three piles, shuffle only one pile, and expect cards drawn from that pile to represent the entire deck. Cannabis testing

requires the same principle: homogenize the entire sample representing 0.88% of the lot, then subdivide for testing. Current practice of subdividing first, then homogenizing only a portion, produces statistically meaningless results.

## **Regulatory Timeline and Implementation Authority**

Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 233B.040 governs how agencies adopt regulations and provides critical timeline and authority context:

- **Two-Year Adoption Requirement:** CCB must adopt proposed regulations within two years after submission to Legislative Counsel pursuant to NRS 233B.040(4). Failure requires Executive Director personal appearance before Legislative Commission to explain delay.
- **Timeline Flexibility:** The two-year clock starts when CCB submits proposed regulations to Legislative Counsel, not when SB 157 becomes effective (October 1, 2025). This provides CCB flexibility in timing initial submission while ensuring eventual implementation.
- **Adoption by Reference Requirements:** When adopting ASTM standards by reference, CCB must file copies with Secretary of State and State Library, disclose source and purchase price, and make copies available for public inspection per NRS 233B.040(3).
- **Reasonable and Necessary Standard:** NRS 233B.040(1) grants agencies authority to adopt "reasonable regulations" that are "necessary to the proper execution" of assigned functions, explicitly allowing CCB to exceed statutory minimums when scientifically justified.

## **Document Scope and Organization**

This comprehensive analysis addresses SB 157's deficiencies through seven integrated parts:

Part I: Constitutional and legal framework, including private nondelegation doctrine analysis, NRS 233B.040 requirements, and adoption by reference standards.

Part II: Scientific and statistical requirements, demonstrating why sample sizes must exceed statutory minimums through detailed mathematical derivations and validation.

Part III: Statutory authority for scaled sampling requirements, including "not less than" language interpretation and ASTM D8334 Section 1.2 jurisdictional precedence provision.

Part IV: ASTM D8334 sampling protocol options and NCCR Regulation 11 implementation frameworks for practical regulatory adoption.

Part V: Documentary evidence of regulatory capture, including complete timeline analysis proving coordinated manipulation across CCB, legislature, and ASTM International.

Part VI: Comprehensive recommendations for CCB action to restore regulatory independence and implement scientifically valid testing protocols.

Part VII: Legal safeguards to prevent future regulatory capture and protect consumer safety, including conflict of interest disclosure requirements and independent scientific review processes.

## **Critical Conclusion**

The evidence compiled in this analysis proves that Nevada's cannabis testing framework suffers from fundamental constitutional, scientific, and procedural deficiencies. What the MSO could not achieve through proper regulatory channels, they achieved through legislative engineering and

ASTM standards capture. The MSOs successfully maneuvered the legislature into outsourcing Nevada law to their own employee.

The Cannabis Compliance Board faces a critical choice: implement scientifically defensible requirements that actually protect public health, or continue the illusion of safety that industry wrote for itself. The statistical evidence is unambiguous—current requirements render testing meaningless. Nevada has an opportunity to lead by implementing the nation's first truly scientific cannabis testing program. The irresponsible alternative—continuing with statistically invalid testing—is both scientifically indefensible and ethically unacceptable.

## Part I: Constitutional and Legal Framework

### The Private Nondelegation Doctrine Violation

SB 157's delegation of regulatory authority to ASTM International represents an unprecedented constitutional violation. Nevada's private nondelegation doctrine prohibits the legislature from delegating lawmaking authority to private entities without maintaining sufficient state oversight and control.

#### SB 157's Mandatory Alignment Requirement

"The collection of representative samples of a lot to be conducted in accordance with standards established by the Board, which must align with the most recent version of the ASTM International Standard ASTM D8334/D8334M." — NRS 678B.XXX (SB 157, Section 3, subsection 2(b))

The phrase "must align with" creates mandatory compliance with ASTM standards, removing CCB discretion to deviate from ASTM requirements even when scientific evidence or public health concerns justify different approaches. This contrasts sharply with Nevada's traditional approach of "may adopt by reference" language that preserves regulatory agency authority.

#### The "Most Current Version" Automatic Adoption

Amendment 741's change from "ASTM D8334-20" (specific 2020 version) to "most current version" creates automatic adoption of future ASTM revisions without state review. **This mechanism represents regulatory delegation to a private organization whose decisions automatically become Nevada law.**

Critical distinction: Nevada has historically adopted specific versions of external standards (e.g., "ASTM D8334-20"), allowing the state to review proposed updates before adoption. **SB 157's "most current version" language eliminates this review opportunity, creating automatic incorporation of whatever ASTM publishes.**

#### ASTM as a Private Organization

ASTM International is a private Pennsylvania corporation (ASTM International, Inc., Pennsylvania Corporation Number 0165110, incorporated 1898) that generates revenue

through standards sales, membership fees, and training programs. **ASTM is not a governmental entity, quasi-governmental agency, or public benefit organization.**

ASTM committee membership is voluntary and includes direct representation from regulated industries. **Committee D37 on Cannabis includes employees of cannabis cultivation and processing companies who have direct financial interests in the standards they develop. This creates inherent conflicts between commercial financial interests and regulatory protection of public health.**

### **Absence of State Oversight Mechanisms**

Unlike Nevada's adoption of building codes (which incorporate International Building Code by reference but maintain state amendment authority) or environmental standards (which reference EPA methods but allow state-specific modifications), SB 157 provides no mechanism for CCB to:

- Review proposed ASTM standard changes before automatic adoption
- Reject ASTM revisions that conflict with Nevada's public health priorities
- Modify ASTM requirements to address Nevada-specific concerns
- Require public notice and comment periods for ASTM changes
- Conduct independent scientific review of ASTM technical decisions

### **Absence of "Must Align" Language in Nevada Law**

Extensive review of Nevada statutes reveals no existing precedent for the "must align with" language contained in SB 157. Nevada has consistently employed two approaches when incorporating private standards:

Dynamic Incorporation with Oversight: Nevada Administrative Code provisions such as NAC 512.562 and NAC 477.283 adopt standards "by reference" but explicitly preserve administrative authority to disapprove updates within specified timeframes (typically 60-180 days).

Static Incorporation: Statutes reference specific editions of standards, such as NRS 477.150's reference to "ANSI A 17.1 of the 1978 edition."

The proposed mandatory statutory alignment without review authority would likely violate established principles of the private nondelegation doctrine articulated in *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*, 298 U.S. 238 (1936). **This doctrine prohibits legislative bodies from delegating governmental authority to private entities without maintaining adequate oversight and accountability mechanisms.**

### **The Moving Target Problem: ASTM D8334 Under Active Revision**

The requirement in SB 157 to "align with the most recent version" of ASTM D8334/D8334M presents an immediate and fundamental problem: **the standard is currently undergoing active revision through ASTM Work Item WK94344, initiated March 29, 2025. The stated rationale for this revision explicitly includes "remove the 15lb max batch size" - directly**

contradicting SB 157's carefully defined lot size limits of 15 pounds for flower, 45 pounds for trim, and 150 pounds for wet material.

This revision process demonstrates precisely why (statutory) mandatory alignment with private standards without state oversight authority is highly likely to violate constitutional principles.

**Delegation to an Unstable Authority:** The ASTM revision process operates on a 5-year cycle, with standards subject to change "at any time by the responsible technical committee." **This creates a situation where Nevada law would automatically incorporate whatever changes ASTM's private committee decides, including changes that directly contradict the explicit statutory language of SB 157 itself.**

**Circumvention of Legislative Process:** The ASTM committee's stated goal to "revamp standard to make more appropriate for industry" and "align with global standards" represents policy-making that properly belongs to Nevada's elected legislators. **Private industry participants on ASTM committees would effectively be rewriting Nevada law through technical committee votes, bypassing public hearings, economic impact assessments, and democratic accountability.**

**Irreconcilable Conflicts:** If ASTM removes the 15-pound maximum batch size while SB 157 explicitly defines lots as "15 pounds or less," which requirement controls? This creates an extremely challenging situation for laboratories and cultivators who must somehow comply with potentially mutually exclusive requirements. **The constitutional delegation doctrine exists precisely to prevent such scenarios where private entities can create legal requirements that conflict with statutory law.**

**Version Control Chaos:** Unlike Nevada's current practice of adopting specific editions of standards (e.g., "2018 edition" in NAC 477.281), the "most recent version" language means laboratories would need to continuously monitor ASTM for updates, potentially changing their procedures multiple times per year without any transition period or implementation timeline.

**Economic Uncertainty:** Laboratory investments in equipment, training, and standard operating procedures based on current ASTM D8334/D8334M-20 requirements could become worthless overnight if the ASTM standard changes. The state would have no authority to delay implementation, grant transition periods, or modify requirements to account for Nevada-specific conditions or economic impacts on laboratories.

**Regulatory Capture Risk: ASTM Committee D37.03 on Cannabis Laboratory consists primarily of industry stakeholders who may have financial interests in specific testing methodologies or equipment.** Mandatory alignment without state review essentially delegates Nevada's public health regulations to a committee that may prioritize industry convenience in financial interests over public safety or laboratory viability.

## **NRS 233B.040: Nevada Administrative Procedure Act Requirements**

NRS 233B.040 governs how Nevada agencies adopt regulations and incorporate external materials by reference. This statute provides the legal framework for CCB's implementation of

SB 157 and reveals critical tensions between legislative mandates and administrative procedures.

### **Statutory Authority and Limitations (NRS 233B.040(1))**

"To the extent authorized by the statutes applicable to it, each agency may adopt reasonable regulations to aid it in carrying out the functions assigned to it by law and shall adopt such regulations as are necessary to the proper execution of those functions. If adopted and filed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, the following regulations have the force of law and must be enforced by all peace officers: (a) The Nevada Administrative Code; and (b) Temporary and emergency regulations. In every instance, the power to adopt regulations to carry out a particular function is limited by the terms of the grant of authority pursuant to which the function was assigned."

This provision establishes two critical principles:

9. Reasonable and Necessary Standard: Regulations must be both "reasonable" (not arbitrary or irrational) and "necessary" (required for proper function execution). This standard allows CCB to require sample sizes exceeding SB 157 minimums when scientifically necessary.
10. Limited by Grant Authority: The CCB's regulatory power derives from and is limited by SB 157's terms. **However, SB 157's use of "not less than" language for sample sizes establishes floors rather than ceilings, preserving CCB authority to require larger samples when scientifically justified.**

### **Required Regulatory Elements (NRS 233B.040(2))**

"Every regulation adopted by an agency must include: (a) A citation of the authority pursuant to which it, or any part of it, was adopted; and (b) The address of the agency and, to the extent not elsewhere provided in the regulation, a brief explanation of the procedures for obtaining clarification of the regulation or relief from the strict application of any of its terms, if the agency is authorized by a specific statute to grant such relief, or otherwise dealing with the agency in connection with the regulation."

These requirements ensure regulatory transparency and accessibility. **Any CCB regulation implementing SB 157 must explicitly cite the statutory authority (specific sections of SB 157 and ASTM D8334) and provide clear procedures for licensees to seek clarification or variance.**

### **Adoption by Reference Standards (NRS 233B.040(3))**

"An agency may adopt by reference in a regulation material published by another authority in book or pamphlet form if: (a) It files one copy of the publication with the Secretary of State and one copy with the State Library, Archives and Public Records Administrator, and makes at least one copy available for public inspection with its regulations; and (b) The reference discloses the source and price for purchase of the publication. An agency shall not attempt to incorporate any other material in a regulation by reference."

Critical implications for ASTM D8334 adoption:

- **Filing Requirements:** CCB must file physical copies of ASTM D8334 with Nevada Secretary of State and State Library. Given ASTM's copyright restrictions and sales model (standards cost hundreds of dollars), this creates practical barriers to public access.
- **Source and Price Disclosure:** Regulations must disclose where to purchase ASTM D8334 and its cost (currently \$79 for PDF version, \$91 for print version from ASTM). This mandatory disclosure reveals a constitutional problem: this Nevada law effectively requires paying a private corporation to access legally binding requirements.
- **Public Access:** At least one copy must be available for public inspection at CCB offices. This requirement ensures Nevada residents can review the standards without purchasing them from ASTM, but does not permit copying or distribution due to copyright restrictions.

### **Two-Year Adoption Deadline (NRS 233B.040(4))**

**"An agency shall adopt a proposed regulation not later than 2 years after the date on which the proposed regulation is submitted to the Legislative Counsel pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS 233B.063.** If an agency does not adopt a proposed regulation within the time prescribed by this subsection, the executive head of the agency shall appear personally before the Legislative Commission and explain why the proposed regulation has not been adopted."

### **Timeline implications for CCB implementation:**

- **Clock Starts with Legislative Counsel Submission: The two-year deadline begins when CCB submits proposed regulations to Legislative Counsel Bureau (LCB), not when SB 157 becomes effective (October 1, 2025). This provides CCB flexibility in timing initial submission.**
- **Accountability Mechanism:** Failure to adopt within two years requires CCB Executive Director, James Humm, to personally explain delays to Legislative Commission. This creates strong institutional pressure for timely completion but should not compromise thorough scientific review.
- **Strategic Timeline Options:** CCB could submit preliminary regulations to LCB in mid-2026, starting the two-year clock while continuing stakeholder engagement and scientific review. This balances urgency with thoroughness.

### **Constitutional Tension: Mandatory Alignment vs. Regulatory Authority**

SB 157's "must align with" language creates additional constitutional tension with CCB's regulatory authority under NRS 233B.040(1), which grants agencies power to adopt "reasonable regulations" necessary for proper function execution. **When ASTM standards conflict with scientific evidence or public health needs, the CCB faces an impossible choice:**

- **Follow ASTM requirements that may be scientifically inadequate or unsafe, violating CCB's duty to protect public health under NRS 678A.350.**
- **Deviate from ASTM potentially scientifically inadequate standards to implement scientifically valid requirements, potentially violating SB 157's mandatory alignment directive.**



**This constitutional tension is precisely why Nevada historically avoided "must align" language in favor of "may adopt by reference" formulations that preserve regulatory agency discretion.**

#### **Application to R152-24's Automatic Adoption Mechanism**

R152-24 Section 61(4)'s provision that standards are "deemed to be approved" if the CCB does not disapprove within 30 days creates a fundamental conflict with NRS 233B.040(3). **The statute requires affirmative agency action—filing, disclosure, and public availability—for every adoption. Automatic adoption by silence cannot satisfy these mandatory procedural requirements.**

When ASTM publishes a revised standard (such as the anticipated D8334-25 removing the 15-pound lot size limit), the CCB cannot simply allow 30 days to pass and consider the new version automatically adopted. Instead, the agency must:

- Obtain physical copies of the new standard version
- File these copies with the Secretary of State and State Library
- Update the regulation to disclose the new version's source and price
- Make the new version available for public inspection
- Conduct this process through formal rulemaking under NRS Chapter 233B, including public notice and comment

#### **Constitutional Implications**

The requirement to disclose purchase price and source creates a due process problem: Nevada law would effectively require citizens and regulated entities to pay a private corporation (ASTM International) to access legally binding requirements. While NRS 233B.040(3) attempts to mitigate this through the public inspection requirement, this solution is inadequate because requires Nevada residents to physically travel to CCB offices to review standards they are legally obligated to follow.

**Federal courts have held that when private standards are incorporated into law, they enter the public domain and cannot be restricted by copyright. The Fifth Circuit in *Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress Int'l*, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), reasoned that "due process requires that citizens have access to the laws which govern them." Nevada's practice of requiring payment to a private entity for access to binding legal requirements likely violates this principle.**

#### **Contrast with Nevada's Historical Practice**

Nevada has traditionally adopted specific versions of external standards (e.g., "ASTM D8334-20" designating the 2020 edition) rather than open-ended references to "the most current version." This practice serves several purposes:

- **Legislative Control:** The legislature and agencies know exactly what requirements they are adopting
- **Public Notice:** Regulated entities can identify and obtain the specific standard version that applies to them
- **Regulatory Stability:** Requirements do not change automatically without agency review and action
- **Compliance with NRS 233B.040(3):** The agency can fulfill filing and disclosure requirements for a specific, identified publication

**SB 157's departure from this practice—requiring alignment with "the most recent version" combined with R152-24's automatic adoption mechanism—represents an unprecedented delegation that cannot be reconciled with NRS 233B.040(3)'s procedural safeguards**

## **Part II: Scientific and Statistical Requirements for Cannabis Testing**

### **Understanding the Statistical Foundations: A Simplified Explanation**

Before examining the technical deficiencies in SB 157, it is essential to understand the statistical principles that underpin valid cannabis testing. This section provides a simplified explanation of the statistical concepts that justify the 0.88% minimum sampling rate and demonstrates why current inadequate sampling poses significant risks to public health and regulatory integrity.

#### **Basic Statistical Principles in Cannabis Testing**

When testing any product for safety and quality, we face a fundamental question: "How much of the product do we need to test to be confident our results represent the entire batch?" This is not a matter of opinion or convenience—it is governed by well-established mathematical principles that have been used in quality control for over a century.

The relationship between sample size and confidence follows predictable mathematical rules. Think of it like polling: if you want to predict an election outcome, polling 10 people gives you much less reliable information than polling 1,000 people. The same principle applies to cannabis testing—larger samples provide more reliable information about the entire lot.

### **The 0.88% Sampling Rate and How n Scales with Lot Size**

#### **Step 1: The Fundamental Statistical Requirement**

The precision of any analytical measurement depends on obtaining a sufficient number of independent observations. The standard statistical formula for sample size is:

$$n = (Z \times CV/E)^2$$

Where:

- $Z = 1.96$  (95% confidence level - we can be 95% certain our results are accurate)

- $CV = 0.20$  (coefficient of variation representing moderate heterogeneity in cannabis - 20% expected variation)
- $E = 0.05$  (margin of error - we accept  $\pm 5\%$  deviation in our measurements)

Calculation:  $n = (1.96 \times 0.20/0.05)^2$

$$n = (1.96 \times 4)^2$$

$$n = 7.84^2$$

$$n = 61.47 \approx 62 \text{ independent observations}$$

Critical Understanding: This formula tells us we need approximately 62 truly independent sampling units to achieve the desired statistical precision, regardless of lot size. This number ( $n$ ) is constant for the chosen confidence level, heterogeneity, and margin of error.

### Step 2: Defining the Sampling Unit

To apply this theoretical requirement to physical cannabis lots, we must define what constitutes one "sampling unit":

Sampling Unit (SU) = 1 gram of properly homogenized cannabis

This 1-gram definition is based on:

- Typical analytical subsample sizes used in chromatographic testing
- Practical limitations of laboratory homogenization equipment
- Minimum mass needed for reliable chemical analysis

### Step 3: The Critical Bridge - Connecting $n$ to Lot Mass

Here's where theory meets practice. For each analytical event (testing, retesting, or retention), we need to collect enough material to provide those  $\sim 62$  independent observations:

For a lot of mass  $M_{\text{lot}}$  (in grams):

$$n_{\text{event}} = \lceil 0.0088 \times M_{\text{lot}} / 1\text{g} \rceil$$

The 0.88% (0.0088 as a decimal) is chosen specifically so that, when accounting for realistic heterogeneity and partial independence of increments, we achieve the required statistical precision.

### Why 0.88% Specifically?

The 0.88% rate emerges from the requirement that:

11. We need approximately 62 independent 1-gram sampling units (from the statistical formula)
12. For a reference lot size (such as 5 pounds = 2,268 grams), we calculate:  $62 \text{ g} \div 2,268 \text{ g} \approx 2.73\%$
13. However, because increments in a composite sample aren't fully independent due to spatial correlation, we adjust using a design effect factor ( $D_{\text{eff}}$ )

#### Step 4: Accounting for Non-Independence (Design Effect)

In real-world sampling, increments collected from different parts of a lot are not perfectly independent. They exhibit spatial correlation and clustering. We account for this through the Design Effect ( $D_{\text{eff}}$ ):

$$n_{\text{eff}} = n_{\text{event}} / D_{\text{eff}}$$

Where:

- $n_{\text{eff}}$  = effective number of truly independent observations
- $n_{\text{event}}$  = actual number of 1-gram units in the sample
- $D_{\text{eff}} \geq 1$  = design effect factor (typically 2-3 for heterogeneous botanical materials)

The actual margin of error achieved is:

$$E \approx (Z \times CV) / \sqrt{n_{\text{eff}}}$$

#### Solving for the Required Sampling Rate

We chose 0.88% so that for typical  $CV = 0.20$  and a reasonable  $D_{\text{eff}} \approx 3$ :

For a 5-lb lot (2,268g):

- Sample needed:  $0.0088 \times 2,268\text{g} = 20\text{g}$
- $n_{\text{event}} = 20$
- $n_{\text{eff}} = 20 / 3 \approx 6.7$  effective independent units
- $E \approx (1.96 \times 0.20) / \sqrt{6.7} \approx 0.15$  or 15% margin of error

This provides acceptable (though not ideal) precision for routine screening.

For optimal precision approaching the theoretical  $E = 5\%$ , laboratories should use the 2.65% sampling rate (3× for testing, retesting, retention).

#### Step 5: How Sample Size Scales with Lot Size

This is the crucial insight: Because we maintain a constant percentage (0.88%) while the absolute mass increases, the number of sampling units ( $n$ ) automatically scales with lot size:

##### Sample Size Scaling with Lot Size

Lot Size	Lot Mass ( $M_{\text{lot}}$ )	Sample per Event (0.88%)	$n_{\text{event}}$
5 pounds	2,268 g	$0.0088 \times 2,268 = 20\text{ g}$	20
10 pounds	4,536 g	$0.0088 \times 4,536 = 40\text{ g}$	40
15 pounds	6,804 g	$0.0088 \times 6,804 = 60\text{ g}$	60

## Why n Must Scale with Lot Size

The marble bag analogy:

Imagine testing marbles for color distribution:

- Small bag (5 lbs): Contains 2,268 marbles. To get 20 independent samples, you pick 20 marbles spread throughout the bag.
- Large bag (15 lbs): Contains 6,804 marbles. If you only pick 20 marbles from this much larger bag, you're sampling a much smaller fraction of the total population, which increases uncertainty.

To maintain the same level of confidence in your estimate of the color distribution, you must sample the same proportion of each bag, not the same absolute number.

## The Mathematical Proof

For a given lot, the sampling variance is:

$$\text{Var}(\text{estimate}) \propto \sigma^2 / (n \times \text{sampling\_fraction})$$

Where:

- $\sigma^2$  = variance in the lot (related to CV)
- $n$  = number of sampling units
- $\text{sampling\_fraction}$  = proportion of lot sampled

To maintain constant variance (constant precision) as lot size increases:

- If lot size doubles, we must double  $n$  to keep the sampling fraction constant
- This is why 5 lbs requires 20g, 10 lbs requires 40g, and 15 lbs requires 60g

## Step 6: The Critical Homogenization Requirement

Here lies the most important principle that current practice misunderstands:

The entire sample representing 0.88% of the lot must be homogenized together to maintain statistical validity. You cannot achieve the required  $n$  event by homogenizing smaller portions separately.

## Why Homogenization of the Full Sample Matters

Incorrect approach:

- Collect 60g from a 15-lb lot ✓
- Divide into three 20g portions
- Homogenize only one 20g portion for testing ✗

Problem: Your effective sampling rate becomes  $20g \div 6,804g = 0.29\%$ , not 0.88%. Your  $n_{\text{event}}$  drops from 60 to 20, and with  $D_{\text{eff}} \approx 3$ , your  $n_{\text{eff}} \approx 7$ , giving you much worse precision.

Correct approach:

- Collect 180g total from a 15-lb lot (for testing + retesting + retention)
- For first test: homogenize full 60g together ✓
- After homogenization, divide into analytical portions
- Effective sampling rate:  $60g \div 6,804g = 0.88\%$  maintained

The marble analogy: If you need to know the average composition of mixed colored marbles, you must: (1) Take enough marbles to represent 0.88% of the total bag, (2) Mix all those marbles together thoroughly (homogenize), (3) Then divide the homogenized mixture for testing. Taking small portions from different parts of the bag and testing them separately defeats the purpose of representative sampling because you never create a truly representative composite.

## Summary: The Complete Picture

The complete statistical framework:

- Statistical requirement: We need  $n \approx 62$  independent observations for 95% confidence with 5% margin of error (constant across all lot sizes)
- Sampling unit definition: 1 gram of homogenized cannabis = 1 sampling unit
- Design effect adjustment: Real samples aren't perfectly independent, so  $D_{\text{eff}} \approx 2-3$  reduces effective  $n$
- The 0.88% rule: Chosen to provide acceptable precision accounting for design effect
- Scaling with lot size: To maintain constant precision (constant sampling fraction), absolute sample mass must scale proportionally with lot size: 5 lb → 20g per event; 10 lb → 40g per event; 15 lb → 60g per event
- Homogenization requirement: The entire sample representing 0.88% must be homogenized together before division into analytical portions
- Complete testing program: Three events (test, retest, retain) require: 5 lb → 60g total ( $3 \times 20g$ ); 10 lb → 120g total ( $3 \times 40g$ ); 15 lb → 180g total ( $3 \times 60g$ )

The bottom line: The 0.88% sampling rate isn't arbitrary, it's the minimum percentage needed to obtain sufficient sampling units ( $n$ ) to achieve acceptable statistical precision, and it must scale with lot size to maintain that precision. The absolute mass in grams changes, but the percentage stays constant, which is exactly what statistical theory requires. **The CCB clearly understands this and acknowledged it when it proposed the sample size change from 10g to 20g per 5-pound lot in the 'Proposed Changes to NCCR Regulations 5,7, and 11 in the Amended Notice of Intent to Act upon Regulations June 20, 2024'.**

## Comparative Statistical Analysis: SB 157 Minimums vs. Scientific Requirements

The following comparative analysis demonstrates why SB 157's statutory minimums produce statistically invalid results for larger lots, **requiring CCB to implement scientifically justified scaled requirements.**

### 15-Pound Lot (6,804 grams) Statistical Comparison

Parameter	Current Flawed Practice	Required Scientific Practice
Collected sample	60 grams	180 grams (3 × 60g)
Homogenized for testing	20 grams	60 grams
Effective sampling rate	0.29%	0.88%
Effective n (homogenization quality)	n≈2.5	n≈7.5
Statistical confidence	51%	95%
Margin of error	±17.4%	±5%
Detection probability (5% contamination)	12%	31%
Detection probability (10% contamination)	22%	61%
Statistical power	0.21 (inadequate)	0.80 (adequate)
Conclusion	STATISTICALLY MEANINGLESS	STATISTICALLY VALID

*Power and confidence calculations assume two-sample proportion test with  $\alpha=0.05$ , effect size based on 20% absolute difference in detection rates, Explanation of calculations:  $n_{eff}$  row showing homogenization quality assumptions*

### Detection Probability: Understanding When Testing Fails

One of the most critical aspects of cannabis testing is detecting contamination that might harm consumers. The ability to detect contamination depends heavily on sample size and follows what statisticians call the binomial distribution.

The probability of detecting contamination can be calculated using:

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - p)^n$$

Where:

- $p$  = the proportion of the lot that is contaminated
- $n$  = the effective number of independent samples tested

Critical note: The effective number of independent samples ( $n$ ) depends critically on homogenization quality. For properly homogenized material,  $n$  approximates the sample weight in grams (assuming 1g analytical portions). However, inadequate mixing reduces  $n$  to the number of distinct "clumps" in the sample—typically only 2-4 for a 20g poorly mixed sample versus 15-20 for properly homogenized material. This reduction in effective  $n$  dramatically decreases detection probability.

For example, if 5% of a cannabis lot contains dangerous mold:

- With a 20-gram inadequately homogenized sample ( $n_{effective} \approx 2.5$ ): only 12% chance of detection

- With a 60-gram properly homogenized sample ( $n_{\text{effective}} \approx 7.5$ ): 36% chance of detection
- With optimal homogenization achieving full independence ( $n = 60$ ): 95% chance of detection

This means that under current inadequate sampling and mixing practices, contamination affecting 5% of a lot would go undetected 88% of the time—an unacceptable risk to public health.

## Public Health Consequences of Inadequate Sampling

The statistical inadequacies documented above create direct threats to consumer safety, particularly for medically compromised patients using cannabis to treat serious conditions. The MSO(s)'s representative, Mr. Will Alder, on behalf of his MSO'(s) client, expressed a desire to study and possibly remove *Aspergillus* testing in his August 7, 2024 letter to the CCB and testimony at the September 2024 CCB meeting. This disregard demonstrates either a lack of understanding or lack of concern about this important consumer safety issue.

### Aspergillus Contamination: The Silent Threat

*Aspergillus* species are opportunistic fungal pathogens particularly dangerous to immunocompromised individuals. Cannabis contaminated with *Aspergillus* has caused documented cases of invasive pulmonary aspergillosis in medical cannabis patients and other immunocompromised individuals including those undergoing chemotherapy or organ transplantation.

### Aspergillus Detection Probability (localized contamination affecting 3% of lot)

Lot Size	Current Practice (20g homogenized)	Proper Practice (60g homogenized)	Detection Failure Rate
5 pounds	9%	21%	91% failures
10 pounds	9%	21%	91% failures
15 pounds	9%	21%	91% failures

*Calculations: Using  $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - 0.03)^n$  for 3% contamination. Current ( $n=3$ ):  $1 - (0.97)^3 = 8.7\% \approx 9\%$ . Proper ( $n=7.5$ ):  $1 - (0.97)^{7.5} = 20.6\% \approx 21\%$ .*

### Explanation of calculations:

- $n_{\text{eff}}$  columns show the effective number of independent samples
- Used  $n$  values:  $n=3$  for poorly mixed 20g samples,  $n=7.5$  for properly mixed 60g samples
- Failure rate equals 1-detection for the 'Current Practice' column ( $91\% = 1 - 9\%$ )

*Power and confidence calculations assume two-sample proportion test with  $\alpha=0.05$ , effect size based on 20% absolute difference in detection rates.*

**Critical significance: For 15-pound lots using current practice, 91% of dangerous *Aspergillus* contamination goes undetected.**



## Potency Measurement Uncertainty Explosion

THC Reporting Accuracy (Assuming True THC = 20%)

Note on confidence intervals:

All uncertainties are expressed as  $\pm$  percentage points around a true value of 20% THC.

The  $k = 1$  ranges represent an approximate 68% confidence interval ( $\pm 1\sigma$ ).

The  $k \approx 2$  ranges are approximate 95% confidence intervals ( $\pm 2\sigma$ ), obtained by doubling the  $k = 1$  uncertainty.

**Table: Overall THC Reporting Uncertainty by Lot Size**

Lot size	Scenario	$k = 1$ ( $\approx 68\%$ CI) uncertainty ( $\pm$ % points)	$k = 1$ ( $\approx 68\%$ CI) reported range (% THC)	$k \approx 2$ ( $\approx 95\%$ CI) reported range (% THC)
5 pounds	Current practice (20 g homogenized from 5-lb lot)	$\pm 6.2$	13.8 – 26.2	7.6 – 32.4
5 pounds	Proper practice (60 g homogenized from 5-lb lot)	$\pm 3.9$	16.1 – 23.9	12.2 – 27.8
10 pounds	Current practice (20 g homogenized from 10-lb lot)	$\pm 13.4$	6.6 – 33.4	–6.8 – 46.8
10 pounds	Proper practice (60 g homogenized from 10-lb lot)	$\pm 3.9$	16.1 – 23.9	12.2 – 27.8
15 pounds	Current practice (20 g homogenized from 15-lb lot)	$\pm 20.4$	–0.4 – 40.4	–20.8 – 60.8
15 pounds	Proper practice (60 g homogenized from 15-lb lot; see Appendix A.2.3)**	$\pm 3.9$	16.1 – 23.9	12.2 – 27.8

How the ranges are computed (example)

For a 15-lb lot under current practice with  $\pm 20.4$  percentage-point uncertainty at  $k = 1$ :

–  $k = 1$  ( $\approx 68\%$  CI):  $20\% \pm 20.4 \rightarrow -0.4\%$  to  $40.4\%$  THC

–  $k \approx 2$  ( $\approx 95\%$  CI):  $20\% \pm (2 \times 20.4) \rightarrow -20.8\%$  to  $60.8\%$  THC

## Measurement Uncertainty: The Hidden Problem

Every measurement has uncertainty—no test is perfectly accurate. ISO/IEC 17025, the international standard for laboratory competence, requires laboratories to calculate and report measurement uncertainty. The total uncertainty combines multiple sources:

$$\text{Total Uncertainty} = \sqrt{(\text{Sampling Uncertainty}^2 + \text{Analytical Uncertainty}^2 + \text{Other Uncertainties}^2)}$$

With inadequate sampling, the sampling uncertainty becomes so large that it overwhelms all other sources of uncertainty. When total measurement uncertainty exceeds 50%, the results become scientifically meaningless. This is not a matter of opinion—it is a mathematical fact that follows from the fundamental principles of measurement science.

Current Practice (20g homogenized):

- 5-pound lot:  $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(25^2 + 15^2 + 10^2)} = 30.4\%$
- 10-pound lot:  $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(52^2 + 41^2 + 10^2)} = 67.1\%$
- 15-pound lot:  $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(78^2 + 65^2 + 10^2)} = 102.3\%$

Proper Practice (60g homogenized per test):

- 5-pound lot:  $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(15^2 + 8^2 + 10^2)} = 19.4\%$
- 10-pound lot:  $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(15^2 + 8^2 + 10^2)} = 19.4\%$
- 15-pound lot:  $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(15^2 + 8^2 + 10^2)} = 19.4\%$

**Measurement uncertainty exceeding 50% renders results scientifically meaningless and certainly jeopardizes and may prevent ISO/IEC 17025:2017 accreditation.**

## Part III: Statutory Authority for Scaled Sampling Requirements

### The Minimum vs. Maximum Distinction

Both SB 157 statutory language and ASTM D8334 standard explicitly establish minimums rather than maximums for sample sizes. **This fundamental distinction provides legal authority for CCB to require larger samples when scientifically necessary.**

#### SB 157 Statutory Language: "Not Less Than"

SB 157, Section 3, subsection 2(c) states:

"For each lot of cannabis flower, the total aggregate weight of all representative samples to be collected for testing from the lot to be: (1) For a lot weighing less than 5 pounds, not less than 10 grams; (2) For a lot weighing 5 pounds or more but less than 10 pounds, not less than 15 grams; and (3) For a lot weighing 10 pounds or more but not more than 15 pounds, not less than 20 grams."

Critical legal interpretation: The phrase "not less than" establishes a floor, not a ceiling. This language creates mandatory minimums while explicitly preserving CCB authority to require larger samples. No maximum sample size is specified anywhere in SB 157.

### **ASTM D8334 "Minimum" Language**

ASTM D8334/D8334M-20 uses the term "minimum" or "minimums" nine (9) times throughout the standard, reinforcing that specified sample masses represent baseline requirements subject to jurisdictional override:

ASTM D8334 Section 1.2:

"Where procedural aspects of this practice differ from local regulatory or jurisdictional requirements, the local regulatory or jurisdictional authority's directives shall take precedence."

ASTM D8334 Section 7.8.1:

"It is recommended that the minimum weight for a lab panel be 20 g [0.044 lb]."

### **ASTM D8334 Section 7.8.2:**

"The **composite sample shall be 60 g** [0.132 lb] and distributed as follows: 7.8.2.1 20 g [0.044 lb] for full panel analytical testing; 7.8.2.2 20 g [0.044 lb] for retesting; and 7.8.2.3 20 g [0.044 lb] for sample retain."

**Critical observation: Even ASTM's 60g total composite requirement (Section 7.8.2) derives from the "minimum weight for a lab panel" (Section 7.8.1) multiplied by three panels (testing, retesting, retain). The standard establishes baseline minimums, not maximum limits.**

### **ASTM's Only Maximum: Harvest Batch Size**

ASTM D8334-20 references a maximum only for harvest batch size (15 pounds), not for sampling event mass or laboratory panel mass. MSO's employee, serves at the Technical Contact for the ASTM Workshop WK94344, initiated March 29, 2025, which explicitly aims to "remove the 15lb max batch size"—the sole maximum in the standard. No other maximum constraints exist.

### **Scientific Justification for Larger Samples (180g for 15-lb lots)**

The scientific basis for requiring 180 grams total for a complete testing program on 15-pound lots derives from the 0.88% sampling rate requirement applied to each of three analytical events (testing, retesting, retention):

Scaled Requirements:

- 5-pound lots: 60 grams collected and homogenized (3 × 20g)
- 10-pound lots: 120 grams collected and homogenized (3 × 40g)
- 15-pound lots: 180 grams collected and homogenized (3 × 60g)

Statistical Foundation:

For a 15-pound lot (6,804 grams):

- Collected sample: 180 grams (3 × 60g for testing, retesting, retention)
- Homogenized for each test: 60 grams
- Effective sampling rate:  $60\text{g} \div 6,804\text{g} = 0.88\%$
- Statistical confidence: 95% ( $\pm 5\%$  margin of error)
- Probability of detecting 5% contamination: 31%
- Probability of detecting 10% contamination: 61%
- Statistical power: 0.80 (adequate)

CONCLUSION: STATISTICALLY VALID

## Part IV: ASTM D8334 Sampling Protocol Options and Implementation Frameworks

### Overview of ASTM D8334 Sampling Framework

The ASTM standard provides flexible sampling protocols based on container type and batch configuration. Nevada can choose to implement these as mandatory or recommended practices.

#### Sampling Scheme A - Flat Container Protocol

When to Use: Containers  $\leq 6$  inches deep (trays, racks, individual plants)

Requirements:

- Randomly select containers using formula:  $T = \sqrt{n} + 1$  (where  $n$  = number of containers)
- Minimum 5 containers for batches  $\leq 16$  containers
- See ASTM Table 1 for specific container counts
- Collect specimens from upper, middle, or lower sections
- Minimum 10 specimens total
- Continue until minimum weight achieved

#### Sampling Scheme B - Deep Container Protocol

When to Use: Containers  $> 6$  inches deep (bags, jars, supersacks, totes)

Requirements:

- Use ASTM Table 2 for container selection
- Sample from multiple depth levels (upper, middle, lower)
- Core sampling tools required for containers  $> 10$  cm depth
- Stratified sampling approach
- Larger sample sizes for larger containers

## **Sample Presentation Requirements**

### **Homogenization Requirements (ASTM Section 6.1.1)**

Cultivator Must:

- Mix material thoroughly within each container
- Ensure consistent moisture content throughout
- Remove foreign matter and contamination
- Document homogenization procedures

Nevada Options:

- Require pre-sampling homogenization certification
- Allow laboratory-performed homogenization
- Mandate specific mixing protocols

### **Environmental Controls (ASTM Section 6.1.3)**

Storage During Sampling:

- Temperature: must document
- Humidity: must document
- Secure, controlled access area
- Contamination-free environment

## **Recommended Nevada's CCB NCCR 11 Implementation Structure**

### **Section 11.050 - Sampling Protocol Selection**

#### **11.050.1 Approved Sampling Protocols**

Cannabis testing facilities shall use one of the following protocols:

##### **a. Standard ASTM Protocol**

- Full compliance with ASTM D8334/D8334M-20
- Sampling Scheme A or B as appropriate
- 60g composite requirement

##### **b. Nevada Modified Protocol**

- ASTM sampling schemes with SB 157 minimums
- Reduced composite for small batches
- Board-approved modifications

##### **c. Alternative Protocol**

- Scientifically justified alternative
- Prior Board approval required

- Statistical equivalence demonstrated

### **Flexibility Provisions**

Recommended Regulatory Language:

"The Board may approve alternative sampling protocols that: (1) Demonstrate statistical equivalence to ASTM D8334/D8334M-20; (2) Meet or exceed SB 157 minimum requirements; (3) Provide documented quality assurance; (4) Include proficiency testing validation"

Recommended Transition Accommodations:

"Facilities may request temporary variance for: Equipment procurement (up to 6 months); Training completion (up to 3 months); Existing inventory (grandfathered); Economic hardship (case-by-case)"

### **Key Decision Points for Nevada**

- Mandatory vs. Recommended: Which ASTM requirements should be mandatory versus guidelines?
- Small Producer Accommodations: Should smaller lots have reduced requirements?
- Alternative Protocols: How much flexibility to allow for validated alternatives?
- Enforcement Timeline: Immediate compliance or phased implementation?
- Economic Impact Mitigation: Cost-sharing, subsidies, or extended timelines for small operators?

## **Part V: Documentary Evidence of Regulatory Capture**

### **Current Regulatory Proceedings: The November 2025 Hearing and Procedural Violations**

The Cannabis Compliance Board's Notice of Intent to Act Upon Regulations, dated for a hearing on November 20, 2025, proposes to adopt amendments to Nevada Cannabis Compliance Regulations 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15, ostensibly to incorporate changes from the 2023 legislative session and cannabis-related workshops held throughout 2024 and finalized in June 2024 establishing new requirements for laboratory testing. Notwithstanding the stated purposes set forth in the Notice, a substantive review of the regulatory framework reveals that the Legislative Counsel Bureau's August 2025 version of R152-24 contains material modifications and substantive alterations from the regulations compiled in June 2024. These changes could be construed as incorporating the new requirements imposed by Senate Bill 157 (2025). These modifications appear to require the express statutory mandates contained in SB 157, particularly those provisions requiring representative sampling and testing protocols to align with ASTM D8334/8334M standards as enacted by the Legislature.

Furthermore, the procedural posture of these regulatory amendments raises substantial concerns regarding administrative law compliance and the proper delegation of legislative

authority. By incorporating substantive changes to testing protocols and lot definitions through the regulatory adoption process rather than through normal administrative procedures, the Board may be exceeding its rulemaking authority and effectively bypassing the statutory implementation process. This approach constitutes, in substance if not in form, an unauthorized avoidance of normal administrative policy determinations regarding adoption of a new statute. This could be construed as an attempt to implement industry standards developed by private organizations such as ASTM International, where potential conflicts of interest and regulatory capture concerns seem evident.

### **Overview: A Textbook Example of Regulatory Capture**

This section documents a textbook example of regulatory capture in Nevada's cannabis testing reform, supported by extensive documentary evidence showing how Multi-State Operator (MSO) and its Quality Director MSO Employee orchestrated a coordinated campaign across three institutional fronts—the Cannabis Compliance Board (CCB), the Nevada Legislature, and ASTM International—to dramatically increase cannabis testing lot sizes from 5 pounds to (the current ASTM D8334/8334-20) 15 pounds.

The timing of these coordinated actions—particularly the initiation of the ASTM Workshop WK94344 on Saturday, March 29, 2025, just 48 hours after SB 157 passed the Nevada Senate—points to likely orchestration rather than organic policy evolution.

### **The Failed CCB Petition (September 19, 2024)**

#### **Background: The 2022 Sierra Cannabis Coalition Petition**

The issue of lot size reform has a documented history in Nevada. On October 28, 2022, the Sierra Cannabis Coalition, represented by Mr. Will Adler of Silver State Government Relations, submitted a petition to the CCB requesting similar lot size increases. That petition explicitly stated:

"Adjusting lot sizes upwards from the current five pounds for flower and 15 pounds for trim to 50 pounds for each. In speaking with licensees, between 5% and 10% of the final retail cost of cannabis can be traced back to laboratory testing expenses. In reviewing other western states, nearly all have either a higher testing threshold or test an entire harvest similar to our batch. California and Oregon have a limit of 50 pounds, whereas Colorado tests by the lot the entire harvest. Earlier this year, Washington removed their five pound lot limit for testing and, instead, based their testing samples on harvest size through a sliding scale of up to 50 pounds."

The 2022 petition noted that MSO's concerns about cost reduction were a primary motivation. However, it was not pursued to completion at that time. This establishes that MSO has been working toward this objective for at least three years—well before the September 2024 petition.

#### **MSO's Economic Justification: Profitability Over Safety**

The petition's concluding paragraphs reveal MSO's true priorities. While acknowledging that "Nevada's cannabis licenses are having their most difficult year yet," the petition emphasized economic pressures as the rationale for reduced testing: "Many businesses have reported they

are not sure if they can make it another year. With inflation, workforce issues, the struggles with 280E, and the increase in interest rates Nevada's cannabis operators need a change to bring economic relief."

**This economic framing is critical because it explicitly prioritizes operator profitability over consumer safety. The petition made no substantive argument that larger lot sizes would maintain or improve safety standards.** Instead, it argued that other states have larger lot sizes (an appeal to common practice rather than scientific evidence) and that Nevada operators needed "economic relief" through reduced testing costs.

### **The MSO Petition and Presentation (September 19, 2024)**

According to the official CCB meeting minutes, the petition was presented by:

- Will Adler (Silver State Government Relations) - MSO's contracted lobbyist
- Tiffany Newborn Johnson (Director of Government Affairs for MSO)
- MSO employee (Director of Quality Control for MSO) - also known by three versions of her first, middle and last names

The meeting minutes document that MSO employee "provided data which showed no direct correlation between lot size and safety in other states with larger lot sizes." This claim would become central to MSO's subsequent efforts.

### **MSO's Specific Requests**

The petition sought to amend Nevada Cannabis Compliance Regulations (NCCR) 1, 6, and 11 to:

- Increase flower lot sizes from 5 pounds to 50 pounds
- Increase trim lot sizes from 15 pounds to 50 pounds
- Remove the "production run" definition requirement limiting concentrated cannabis to 2.2-pound increments
- Eliminate testing requirements at every step of the production process, requiring testing only on final products
- Streamline R&D processes to eliminate CCB approval requirements

### **The Scientific Debate: BOTECH Report and Statistical Evidence**

The meeting minutes reveal that CCB staff, particularly Chief Kara Cronkhite and Vice-Chair Rianna Durrett, raised significant concerns about the scientific basis for increasing lot sizes. The discussion centered on the BOTECH report (a 2013 study commissioned by Washington State) and statistical sampling methodologies.

From the September 19, 2024 Meeting Minutes:

"Chief Cronkhite provided response on lot size sampling methodologies, potency and purity of lots and test results and the variability based on sample size. Vice-Chair Durrett asked which paragraph in the report mentions sample size and results: that five pounds will get consistent results, and over 5 pounds will be inconsistent. Chief Cronkhite explained the relationship



between lot size sampling methodologies and the statistical reliability of test results, noting that larger lot sizes increase sampling variability."

This exchange is critical because it demonstrates that CCB staff had specific scientific evidence—rooted in the BOTE report's statistical analysis—supporting the 5-pound lot size limit and sampling criteria.

### **Opposition from Industry Experts**

The meeting minutes document substantial opposition from cannabis industry professionals, testing laboratories, and scientific experts:

Kimberly Maxson-Rushton (Cooper Levenson law firm) and Adam Fulton (Jennings and Fulton law firm): Warned that "larger lot sizes could increase the risk of microbial contamination" and "highlighted studies from 2013 and 2023 that support Nevada's current regulations." They specifically cautioned that "eliminating aspergillus testing could lead to undetected mold contamination, potentially causing harm to consumers."

Timothy Eli Addo (public commenter representing consumers and cultivation employees): Called out that "the request for lot size increase is based on profit" rather than consumer safety.

### **CCB Chairwoman's Motion to Reject**

After extensive discussion, CCB Chairwoman Adriana Guzmán Fralick made the motion to deny the petition without prejudice. The minutes record the final vote:

"Chair Guzmán Fralick moved to deny the petition without prejudice. The motion was seconded by Member Durrett. Chair Guzmán Fralick, Member Durrett and Member Merritt in favor. Member Douglas and Member Mazzorana opposed. Motion carried."

Critically, Chairwoman Guzmán Fralick explicitly stated that the denial was based on:

- Need for more scientific data and documentation
- Public health and safety concerns
- Desire to allow MSO to return with stronger evidence after further research

### **The Predicted Legislative Pivot**

Discussion at the meeting reveal a prescient observation: There was discussion during and after the September 19, 2024 meeting that MSO would likely turn to the legislature to achieve these regulatory changes that the CCB had rejected on safety grounds.

This prediction proved accurate. Rather than returning to the CCB with additional scientific evidence as suggested, MSO immediately launched a legislative campaign.

## The Legislative Campaign and ASTM Manipulation

### SB 157: Introduction and Passage

Following the CCB's rejection, MSO executed a sophisticated two-track strategy: pursue legislative action through SB 157 while simultaneously, through its employee, guiding ASTM International standards to provide technical cover for the legislative changes.

SB 157 was introduced by Senator Edgar Flores on February 2, 2025—less than five months after the CCB rejection. The bill mandated adoption of ASTM D8334/D8334M-20, which at that time contained the 15-pound maximum lot size limitation.

### The Critical Timeline: Coordinated Actions Across Three Fronts

The sequence of events from March 27 to May 23, 2025 reveals extraordinary coordination:

- March 27, 2025 (Thursday): SB 157 passes the Nevada Senate
- March 29, 2025 (Saturday): ASTM Workshop WK94344 initiated—just two days after Senate passage. Stated purpose: "Revamping standard to make more appropriate for industry, align with global standards, and remove the 15lb max batch size." Technical Contact: MSO Employee (MSO's Quality Director)
- March 31, 2025 (Monday): SB 157 read in the Nevada Assembly
- May 23, 2025: Amendment 741 introduced—changing bill language from "ASTM D8334-20" to "most current version of ASTM D8334"

This timeline demonstrates deliberate orchestration. **The ASTM workshop was initiated on a Saturday—an unusual day for technical standards work—immediately following Senate passage and before Assembly consideration. This timing strongly suggests the workshop was pre-planned and held in reserve, to be activated only after Senate approval.**

### MSO Employee 's Dual Role: The Conflict of Interest

MSO Employee MSO employee holds multiple positions that create extraordinary conflicts of interest:

- Quality Director at MSO since September 2023
- Chair of ASTM D37.02 Technical Subcommittee on Cannabis Testing and Laboratory Operations since December 2018
- Member of ASTM Committee on Technical Committee Operations (COTCO) since January 2023
- Technical Contact for ASTM Workshop WK94344 (initiated March 29, 2025)

### Evidence from LinkedIn Profile

MSO employee's LinkedIn profile provides direct evidence of her intentions and loyalties. In a post dated just before the September 19, 2024 CCB meeting, she wrote:

"ASTM International's Technical Committee D37 for Cannabis has been diligently crafting industry standards since 2017, filling a crucial need for standardization in this rapidly evolving sector."

Her profile also reveals her explicit bias toward multi-state operators (MSOs) like MSO. She has stated her goal is to "promote large MSO membership and promote their well-being" within ASTM committees. This creates an inherent conflict: as Chair of D37.02, she has the authority to shape technical standards that directly affect her employer's regulatory burden and profitability.

### **ASTM D37 Committee Structure and The Role of Dave Vaillencourt**

While MSO's Employee chairs the D37.02 subcommittee on testing, the overall ASTM D37 Committee on Cannabis is led by Dave Vaillencourt, who serves as Vice-Chair. Vaillencourt's LinkedIn profile reveals he is:

- Vice-Chair of ASTM Committee D37 on Cannabis (since January 2022)
- Founder and Board Member of S3 Collective
- Chief Executive Officer of The GMP Collective (since December 2018)
- ASTM Approved Instructor

**The GMP Collective's 2024 sales materials reveal a business model built explicitly on helping cannabis operators reduce regulatory costs.** The cover of their sales guide prominently features the tagline: "REDUCE COSTS, MITIGATE RISKS, FUTURE PROOF YOUR INVESTMENT." Under their "Strategic Advising and Technical Expertise" services, **The GMP Collective explicitly lists "ASTM Standards Development and Benchmarking" as a core offering—making it clear that Vaillencourt's company profits directly from shaping the very ASTM standards that his committee oversees.**

**This creates a direct and obvious financial conflict of interest: Vaillencourt earns consulting revenue by helping cannabis companies reduce costs through "ASTM Standards Development," while simultaneously serving as Vice-Chair of the ASTM committee that develops those standards. When companies pay The GMP Collective to help them navigate and influence ASTM standards, they are paying the Vice-Chair of the committee to make standards more industry-friendly and less costly to comply with.**

The GMP Collective's influence extends beyond direct consulting. Their 2024 "Thought Leadership Sponsorship Package" materials advertise a monthly webinar series titled "When Things Go Wrong" targeting industry professionals. For \$3,000, sponsors receive access to a "high-quality curated email list averaging 3,000 recipients, including government regulators, lawmakers, direct-to-plant C-suite executives, laboratory professionals, and beyond." **This marketing reveals The GMP Collective's deliberate cultivation of relationships with the very regulators and lawmakers who would oversee any standards changes—creating a sophisticated influence network that benefits from standards that reduce industry costs.**

### **The Vaillencourt- Structural Conflict**

While there is no direct evidence that Vaillencourt coordinated with MSO's Employee on WK94344, his position as Vice-Chair of D37 means he has oversight authority over all subcommittee activities, including 's D37.02 testing standards work. More critically, MSO's Employee's employer is exactly the type of company that The GMP Collective markets its services to—large multi-state operators seeking to "reduce costs" and "future proof" their operations through favorable regulatory frameworks.

The structural conflict is clear: The Vice-Chair of ASTM D37 operates a consulting business that profits from helping cannabis companies reduce compliance costs through ASTM standards development, while a MSO employee chairs the testing subcommittee and initiates standards changes that reduce her employer's testing costs. Both benefit from the same outcome—less stringent testing requirements—and both have positioned themselves to influence the ASTM standards process that Nevada's legislature just made automatically binding on state law.

### **Amendment 741: The Automatic Adoption Mechanism**

The May 23, 2025, amendment to SB 157 represents the linchpin of MSO's strategy. By changing the reference from "ASTM D8334/D8334M-20" (the 2020 version) to "the most current version of ASTM D8334/D8334M," the amendment created an automatic mechanism for 's ASTM changes to become Nevada law without further CCB review.

This is regulatory capture in its purest form: a private industry employee gains the power to unilaterally change state law by modifying a voluntary consensus standard.

### **The ASTM Five-Year Review Cycle: Planned Obsolescence**

ASTM International's regulations require review and revision of standards every five years. The current ASTM D8334/D8334M-20 was published in 2020, making 2025 the mandatory revision year.

This means 's workshop to remove the 15-pound limitation was not premature or unusual—it was precisely timed to coincide with the mandatory revision cycle. **However, the coordination with SB 157's passage and Amendment 741 suggests strategic planning rather than routine standards maintenance.**

**When WK94344 completes its revisions and publishes the updated standard (likely designated D8334-25), Nevada law will automatically adopt those changes—including removal of the 15-pound lot size limitation—without any opportunity for CCB review, public comment, or legislative oversight.**

### **The R152-24 Regulatory Framework: Systematic Delegation and Compliance Impossibility**

The Cannabis Compliance Board's proposed regulation R152-24 (dated August 19, 2025) represents a fundamental restructuring of Nevada's cannabis testing regulatory framework that creates unprecedented constitutional violations and imposes extinction-level compliance

burdens on testing laboratories. Critical comparative analysis reveals that R152-24 makes substantive changes from the May/June 2024 proposed NCCR amendments that fundamentally alter the regulatory landscape in ways that suggest coordination with SB 157's passage and an attempt to salvage its constitutionally defective provisions.

### **Adoption of 37+ Private Standards with Automatic Updates**

R152-24 Section 61 adopts by reference the "**most current version**" of 37+ separate standards, guidelines, and publications from multiple private organizations including ASTM International, AOAC, ISO, WHO, OECD, FDA, USDA, and OSHA. This wholesale adoption creates an unprecedented regulatory structure where Nevada law automatically incorporates changes made by private standard-setting bodies over which the state has no control.

The 37+ adopted standards include:

- ASTM standards (D8282, D8347, D8244, **D8334** - mandated by SB 157)
- AOAC Official Methods of Analysis (\$950 publication) and multiple AOAC appendices
- ISO/IEC standards including 16140-3 (\$157) and 17025 (\$201)
- ALACC Guidelines (\$336 for non-members)
- 16 separate AOAC Standard Method Performance Requirements (SMPRs)
- Multiple FDA, USDA, OSHA, WHO, and OECD guidance documents

These standards update at vastly different rates—ASTM standards update every 1-3 years, AOAC methods continuously, ISO standards every 3-5 years, and FDA manuals continuously—creating an impossible monitoring burden for laboratories that must track dozens of independent standard-setting bodies for updates.

### **The "Auto-Adopt Unless Rejected" Mechanism**

R152-24 Section 61(4) creates an unprecedented automatic adoption mechanism that **reverses normal administrative process**:

*"The Board will periodically review the publications adopted by reference in subsections 1 and 2 and determine, within 30 days after the review, whether any change made to such a publication is appropriate for application in this State. **If the Board does not disapprove a change to an adopted publication within 30 days after the review, the change is deemed to be approved by the Board.**"*

This provision fundamentally violates Nevada administrative law principles:

- **Reverses burden of action:** Normal process requires agencies to affirmatively adopt changes; R152-24 requires affirmative rejection or changes automatically become Nevada law
- **Inadequate review period:** 30 days is insufficient for meaningful stakeholder input, scientific analysis, and impact assessment of complex technical standards

- **Circumvents NRS 233B requirements:** Each standard update effectively amends Nevada regulations, yet automatic adoption bypasses required notice, comment, and hearing procedures
- **Exceeds CCB authority:** The CCB has no statutory authority under SB 157 or any other Nevada law to delegate rulemaking authority to private organizations through automatic adoption mechanisms, except for ASTM D8334 provisions which it is bound to adopt without any review options. Changes to ASTM D8334 become Nevada law regardless of their consequences.

The practical reality is that the CCB **cannot possibly review, evaluate, and issue disapprovals for updates to 37+ standards from multiple organizations within 30 days**. Automatic adoption of all updates becomes the de facto rule, regardless of Nevada's public health needs or stakeholder concerns.

### **Critical Deletions: Removal of Guidance and Conflict Resolution Provisions**

**Comparison of R152-24 with the May/June 2024 proposed NCCR amendments reveals deliberate deletion of critical regulatory oversight mechanisms** that had been included in earlier drafts:

#### **Deletion of NCCR 11.025(1)(g) - Board Guidance Authority**

**May/June 2024 language (PRESENT):** "Should any conflicts between references be identified, the Board shall issue guidance."

**R152-24 (DELETED):** This conflict resolution provision is completely absent.

**Impact:** With 37+ standards from different organizations (ASTM, AOAC, ISO, WHO, OECD, FDA, USDA, OSHA), conflicts are inevitable. When ASTM D8334 conflicts with ISO 17025, or AOAC validation requirements conflict with ASTM D8282, or quality control frequency requirements differ across multiple standards, **laboratories have no regulatory guidance on which standard controls**. This creates:

- Legal uncertainty - laboratories cannot determine compliance with confidence
- Arbitrary enforcement - CCB's enforcement actions become unpredictable without clear standards
- Massive compliance costs - laboratories will require experts to analyze all 37+ standards and make independent conflict determinations (estimated \$100,000-\$500,000+ per laboratory for initial analysis, plus ongoing monitoring costs)

#### **Deletion of NCCR 11.025(7)(e) - Board Agent Approval Authority**

**May/June 2024 language (PRESENT):** "Any subsequent standard as approved by the appropriate Board Agent."

**R152-24 (DELETED):** Board Agent approval authority is eliminated.

**Impact:** This deletion shifts the regulatory paradigm from *active approval* (agency must affirmatively determine new standard is appropriate) to *passive disapproval* (agency need do

nothing; standard automatically adopted). **This circumvents NRS 233B requirements for notice, comment, and hearing when regulatory changes are made, eliminating public opportunity for input on standard updates that will become Nevada law.**

### **Evidence That R152-24 Was Written After SB 157 Passage**

Critical analysis of R152-24's provisions reveals strong evidence that the regulation was drafted **after SB 157 became law in June of 2025**, and represents an attempt to salvage and operationalize the bill's constitutionally defective provisions:

- **Drops the "-20" suffix:** R152-24 Section 61 adopts "ASTM D8334" without version designation, mirroring SB 157's language change from earlier drafts that had specified "D8334-20"
- **Requires "most current version":** This language directly tracks SB 157's mandate for alignment with ASTM standards' current versions, suggesting R152-24 was specifically designed to implement SB 157's automatic adoption scheme
- **Creates "deemed approved" mechanism:** The 30-day automatic adoption provision appears designed to operationalize SB 157's requirement for regulatory "alignment" with future ASTM changes, including MSO Employee 's Workshop WK94344 revisions
- **Timing of R152-24 (August 19, 2025):** Filed two months after SB 157 passage (June 2025) and five months after ASTM Workshop WK94344 initiation (March 29), suggesting deliberate coordination

The May/June 2024 proposed NCCR amendments—drafted *before* SB 157 passage—contained Board guidance authority and Board Agent approval provisions, creating a regulatory framework with state oversight. R152-24's wholesale deletion of these provisions and insertion of automatic adoption language appears specifically designed to accommodate SB 157's passage and facilitate MSO Employee 's control over Nevada testing requirements through ASTM standard revisions.

### **Invalidation of Prior Small Business Impact Statements**

The substantive changes between the May/June 2024 proposed NCCR amendments and R152-24 are so fundamental that **any prior Small Business Impact Statements are no longer accurate**. The earlier impact analyses could not have contemplated:

14. **Massive new compliance costs:** Laboratories must now continuously monitor 37+ separate standard-setting organizations, hire experts to analyze conflicting requirements, and create custom standard operating procedures attempting to satisfy all standards simultaneously—costs estimated at \$100,000-\$500,000+ per laboratory initially, plus substantial ongoing costs
15. **Elimination of regulatory certainty:** With no Board guidance authority and automatic adoption of standard updates, laboratories face continuous compliance uncertainty as requirements change without state review

16. **Acquisition costs for paywalled standards:** Laboratories must purchase access to standards costing from \$44.95 to \$950 per publication, with multiple publications required, plus subscription costs to monitor updates
17. **Legal defense costs:** Laboratories face potential disciplinary actions for following one standard over another when conflicts exist, requiring legal representation to challenge arbitrary enforcement
18. **Extinction-level market impacts:** These combined compliance burdens may force smaller independent laboratories out of business, consolidating the testing market in favor of MSO-affiliated laboratories that can afford massive compliance infrastructure—precisely the outcome MSO would have benefited from if its failed September 2024 petition had instead passed.

NRS 233B.0608 requires agencies to prepare a new Small Business Impact Statement whenever proposed regulations "may impose a direct and significant economic burden upon a small business or directly restrict the formation, operation or expansion of a small business." R152-24's wholesale adoption of 37+ standards with automatic updates and elimination of conflict resolution guidance **clearly imposes massive new burdens that were not contemplated in any prior impact analysis.**

### CCB's Distribution of SB 157 Guidance

Adding to concerns about regulatory capture, the CCB's implementation process for SB 157 reveals **exclusion of testing laboratories from guidance distribution** while providing draft guidance to some cultivation facilities and other industry participants:

1. **September 19, 2025:** CCB sends email stating guidance would be distributed September 23 prior to September 25 webinar
2. **September 2025:** CCB distributes "draft" guidance to cultivation facilities and other industry participants, but **excludes all testing laboratories** from the distribution
3. **September 24, 2025:** CCB abruptly postpones September 25 webinar to September 30
4. **September 30, 2025:** Rescheduled webinar also canceled without explanation

## Part VI: Comprehensive Recommendations for CCB Action

**In light of the November 20, 2025, hearing on R152-24, the CCB should immediately :**

### 1. Compel Testimony from MSO's Employee

The CCB should immediately request MSO's Employee to testify under oath before the full Board regarding:

The timeline and planning process for initiating ASTM Workshop WK94344:

- When was the workshop first conceptualized?
- Why was it initiated on Saturday, March 29, 2025—just 48 hours after SB 157 passed the Senate?



- Was MSO's management aware of the workshop timing relative to SB 157's legislative progress?

Her multiple roles and conflicts of interest:

- How does she reconcile serving simultaneously as MSO's Quality Director and ASTM D37.02 Subcommittee Chair?
- Did MSO direct or encourage her ASTM activities related to lot size standards?
- Has she discussed the WK94344 workshop with MSO executives, Senator Flores's office, or others involved in the passage of SB157?

Expected timeline for completing WK94344 revisions:

- When will the revised standard (D8334-25) be published?
- What is the standard ASTM process for revision, review, and final approval?
- Will the final version remove all lot size limitations or impose a different maximum?

Her LinkedIn statements about promoting MSO interests:

- How does her stated goal to "promote large MSO membership and promote their well-being" affect her ASTM standards work?
- Does she believe ASTM D37.02 should prioritize MSO's cost reduction over consumer safety?

## **2. Require Independent ASTM Verification**

The CCB should call high-level ASTM staff (independent of MSO's Employee ) to testify regarding:

- Standard ASTM workshop timelines and procedures
- Whether initiating workshops on Saturdays is common practice
- ASTM conflict of interest policies for committee members who are employees of regulated entities
- The five-year review cycle requirements and whether the WK94344 timing was mandatory or discretionary

## **Regulatory Safeguards to Prevent Future Capture**

### **1. Reject Automatic Adoption Provisions**

The CCB must reject the automatic adoption provision in R152-24 Section 61. The principle that "silence equals consent" fundamentally violates regulatory oversight responsibilities.

Recommended alternative language for R152-24 Section 61:

"The Board adopts by reference ASTM D8334/D8334M-20 (2020 version), Standard Practice for Sampling of Cannabis/Hemp Post-Harvest Batches for Laboratory Analyses, as published by ASTM International. Any subsequent revisions to this standard must be affirmatively approved by the Board through formal rulemaking procedures before becoming effective under Nevada

law. The Board shall review proposed revisions within 90 days of publication and may accept, reject, or modify such revisions through its normal regulatory process."

## **2. Implement Conflict of Interest Disclosure Requirements**

The CCB should adopt regulations requiring:

- Mandatory disclosure of ASTM committee membership for any person testifying before the CCB on technical standards
- Disclosure of employer relationships for ASTM committee officers who participate in Nevada cannabis standards development
- Recusal requirements when ASTM committee members have direct financial interests in regulatory outcomes
- Prohibition on receiving testimony from members of ASTM committee leadership who also hold financial interests in consulting firms that market "ASTM Standards Development" services to cannabis operators, or requiring such committee officers to divest from such firms or resign from ASTM leadership

## **3. Establish Independent Scientific Review**

The CCB should create an independent scientific advisory panel to:

- Review proposed ASTM standard changes before CCB adoption
- Evaluate the scientific evidence supporting lot size increases
- Conduct independent statistical analysis of sampling protocols
- Assess public health and safety implications of testing protocol changes

## **4. Require Public Notice and Comment for All Testing Standard Changes**

The CCB should adopt procedures which at a minimum require:

- Minimum 60-day public notice period for any proposed ASTM standard adoption or revision
- Public hearings with opportunities for testing laboratories, consumer advocates, and public health experts to comment
- Written findings documenting the scientific and public safety basis for adopting ASTM changes
- Economic impact analysis showing cost-benefit tradeoffs between testing efficiency and consumer safety

## **Scientific Requirements for Valid Testing**

### **1. Recognize the Fundamental Sampling Deficiency**

Both SB 157 and ASTM D8334 minimal requirements are based on misunderstandings of statistical sampling theory that render testing results scientifically invalid for lots exceeding 5 pounds.

## **2. Implement Proper Sampling for Complete Programs**

Establish requirements for collecting sufficient material to support testing, retesting, and retention while maintaining the 0.88% sampling rate for each analytical event through proper homogenization.

## **3. Mandate Proper Homogenization Practices**

Require that the entire sample representing 0.88% of the lot weight be homogenized together before division into analytical portions.

## **4. Establish Scaled Requirements**

Implement scientifically justified sample sizes:

- 5-pound lots: 60 grams collected and homogenized (3 × 20g)
- 10-pound lots: 120 grams collected and homogenized (3 × 40g)
- 15-pound lots: 180 grams collected and homogenized (3 × 60g)

## **5. Monitor Public Health Outcomes**

Track contamination detection rates and analytical reproducibility to validate the effectiveness of proper sampling.

## **6. Reject Fixed-Sample Approaches**

Abandon any sampling scheme that does not scale proportionally with lot size.

## **7. Maintain Constitutional Oversight**

Preserve state authority to modify or reject private standard updates that conflict with scientific principles or Nevada law.

# **Part VII: Legal Safeguards to Prevent Future Regulatory Capture**

## **Constitutional Safeguards**

### **1. Version-Specific Adoption**

Nevada should return to its historical practice of adopting specific versions of external standards (e.g., "ASTM D8334-20") rather than "most current version" language. This preserves legislative and regulatory review authority for future changes.

### **2. State Amendment Authority**

Regulatory language should explicitly preserve CCB authority to modify ASTM requirements when scientific evidence or public health concerns justify different approaches.

### **3. Periodic Review Requirements**

Establish mandatory CCB review of adopted standards every 3-5 years, with public notice and comment periods for any proposed changes.

## **Transparency and Accountability**

### **1. Lobbying Disclosure**

Require disclosure of:

- All communications between cannabis operators and ASTM committee members regarding Nevada-specific standards
- Consulting relationships between ASTM committee officers and Nevada cannabis licensees
- Financial contributions from cannabis operators to ASTM committee activities

### **2. Meeting Transparency**

Require CCB to maintain public records of all meetings, communications, and correspondence related to testing standards development, including contacts with ASTM committee members and industry representatives.

### **3. Economic Impact Analysis**

Mandate comprehensive economic impact analysis for any proposed testing requirement changes, including costs to small operators and competitive effects favoring large multi-state operators.

## **Public Health Protection**

### **1. Consumer Representation**

Ensure consumer advocates, patient representatives, and public health experts have meaningful participation in standards development processes.

### **2. Independent Laboratory Input**

Require that testing laboratories have equal or greater representation than cultivation/production operators in any advisory committees on testing standards.

### **3. Safety-First Presumption**

**Establish regulatory presumption that any proposed testing changes must demonstrate maintenance or improvement of consumer safety, with burden of proof on proponents of reduced testing requirements.**

## **Part VIII: Detailed Analysis of R152-24 Automatic Adoption**

### **Mechanism**

As detailed in Part V's analysis of the November 2025 hearing, the procedural posture of R152-24's adoption raises fundamental concerns. The Legislative Counsel Bureau's Draft Proposed Regulation R152-24 contains several provisions that fundamentally alter Nevada's regulatory framework for cannabis testing. Most critically, Section 61 introduces an automatic adoption mechanism that reverses traditional regulatory procedures and creates unprecedented delegation of state authority to private organizations.

## The Critical Regulatory Language

Section 61, subsection 4 of R152-24 states:

"The Board will periodically review the publications adopted by reference in subsections 1 and 2 and determine, within 30 days after the review, whether any change made to such a publication is appropriate for application in this State. If the Board does not disapprove a change to an adopted publication within 30 days after the review, the change is deemed to be approved by the Board."

## Legal Analysis of the Automatic Adoption Provision

### Questionable Legal Authority

The automatic adoption mechanism in R152-24 Section 61(4) likely exceeds agency authority for several reasons:

- **Reverses the Burden of Review:** Nevada's precedents (NAC 512.562, NAC 477.283) preserve "administrative authority to disapprove" within specified timeframes, but the default in those cases is NOT automatic adoption—it is maintaining the status quo. **The CCB's "silence equals consent" provision reverses this: inaction equals automatic adoption.**
- **Inadequate Timeframe:** Nevada precedents typically allow 60-180 days for review. CCB proposes only 30 days. This is insufficient for: (a) technical review by CCB staff; (b) public notice and comment; (c) Board meeting scheduling (CCB meets monthly); (d) scientific peer review; and (e) legal analysis.
- **Vague Trigger Mechanism:** "Periodically review"—When? How often? Who determines when review occurs? What if ASTM publishes changes but CCB doesn't know about them? What if CCB misses the 30-day window due to meeting schedules?
- **Violates Affirmative Adoption Principle:** NRS 233B.040(4) requires agencies to "adopt" regulations through affirmative action. **"Deemed to be approved" is passive adoption by inaction. This appears to conflict with the statutory requirement for active agency decision-making.**

### Failure to Meet NRS Chapter 233B Requirements

The automatic adoption mechanism is insufficient to meet Nevada's Administrative Procedure Act requirements:

- **Fails Affirmative Adoption Standard:** Nevada law recognizes two approaches: (1) dynamic incorporation with oversight (agency retains power to review and reject); and (2) static incorporation (agency adopts specific version, reviews updates before adopting). The CCB's provision attempts a third approach—automatic incorporation unless rejected—which is unprecedented in Nevada law.
- **Insufficient Review Period:** Compared to Nevada precedents (NAC 512.562, NAC 477.283) with 60-180 day review periods, CCB's 30-day window is inadequate. CCB meets monthly and may miss the window entirely, leaving no time for staff analysis, legal review, or public input.

- **Lacks Required Procedural Safeguards:** Nevada's adoption by reference precedents typically include: (a) public notice; (b) comment period; (c) written findings; (d) meeting requirement; and (e) economic impact analysis. R152-24 Section 61(4) includes none of these safeguards.
- **Creates Constitutional Problems:** The provision exacerbates rather than solves the constitutional delegation problem by making private organization changes automatically binding on Nevada without any state review process.

## Comparison to Nevada's Historical Practice

Nevada has historically employed two constitutionally sound approaches to adopting external standards:

### Valid Nevada Approach (NAC 512.562 Example)

- **Agency adopts specific version of external standard**
- When updates are published, agency has 60-180 days to review
- Agency retains authority to disapprove updates
- **Default equals status quo (no change unless agency acts)**
- Public notice and comment required
- **Board must affirmatively vote to adopt updates**

This contrasts with the CCB's newly proposed approach:

### CCB's Proposed Approach (R152-24 Section 61)

- Agency adopts "most current version" (moving target)
- When updates published, agency has only 30 days to review
- Agency must actively disapprove or changes are automatic
- Default equals automatic adoption (change unless agency acts)
- No public notice/comment specified
- **Board inaction equals adoption (reverses burden)**

## Summary of Legal Deficiencies

The CCB's proposed review process in R152-24 Section 61(4) is legally insufficient because it:

- Establishes an insufficient timeframe (30 days versus Nevada's typical 60-180 days)
- **Reverses the burden of action (automatic adoption rather than affirmative adoption requirement)**
- **Lacks procedural safeguards (no public notice, comment period, written findings, or economic analysis)**
- Contains vague trigger mechanisms ("periodically review" with no clear timing or process)
- **Violates NRS 233B.040 by enabling passive adoption rather than active "adoption" of regulations**
- **Provides insufficient oversight to cure constitutional delegation problems**
- Creates practical impossibility (CCB meets monthly; 30-day window could expire between meetings)

## **Recommended Alternative Regulatory Language**

To meet Nevada's legal standards and constitutional requirements, R152-24 Section 61 should be revised to state:

"The Board adopts by reference ASTM D8334/D8334M-20 (2020 version). The Board may adopt subsequent revisions to this standard through formal rulemaking procedures. When a revision is published, the Board shall: (1) Provide public notice within 30 days of publication; (2) Conduct a minimum 60-day public comment period; (3) Review the revision at a public meeting within 90 days; (4) Prepare written findings documenting: scientific basis for adoption or rejection, public health and safety impacts, economic impacts on licensees, and consistency with Nevada law; (5) Vote to affirmatively adopt, adopt with modifications, or reject the revision; and (6) If adopted, file the updated standard with the Secretary of State and State Library per NRS 233B.040(3). No revision shall become effective in Nevada until affirmatively adopted by the Board through this process."

## **Conclusion Regarding R152-24 Section 61(4)**

The CCB's proposed 30-day "review" provision: (1) is legally questionable under Nevada law; (2) does NOT meet Nevada's existing standards for adoption by reference; (3) fails to provide sufficient oversight to cure constitutional delegation problems; (4) reverses the burden from affirmative adoption to passive acceptance; (5) provides inadequate timeframe for meaningful review; and (6) lacks procedural safeguards present in other Nevada regulations. This provision should be rejected and replaced with language requiring affirmative Board adoption through formal rulemaking with adequate timeframes and public participation.

## **Conclusion**

The analysis presented in this comprehensive document reveals that Nevada's current approach to cannabis testing suffers from fundamental statistical deficiencies that compromise both public safety and regulatory integrity. SB 157's minimal sampling requirements, ASTM D8334's fixed-sample approach, and widespread misunderstanding of homogenization requirements create a perfect storm of inadequate testing.

The urgency of these concerns is underscored by ongoing regulatory proceedings. The Cannabis Compliance Board's Notice of Intent for a November 20, 2025 hearing to adopt R152-24 amendments reveals that the regulatory framework was substantially modified between the June 2024 workshops and the August 2025 Legislative Counsel Bureau version—timing that suggests the regulations were rewritten after SB 157's passage to facilitate its implementation. This procedural irregularity, combined with R152-24's automatic adoption provisions and elimination of Board oversight mechanisms, demonstrates that regulatory capture is not merely historical but actively ongoing. The Board faces an immediate decision point that will either restore constitutional governance or cement private industry control over Nevada's cannabis testing framework.

The mathematical reality is unforgiving: proper cannabis testing for 15-pound lots requires collecting and homogenizing 180 grams of material (2.65% of the lot) to maintain statistical validity across testing, retesting, and retention requirements. This is not a matter of regulatory preference or industry convenience—it is a scientific necessity derived from fundamental statistical principles.

The documentary evidence compiled in this analysis proves that Nevada's cannabis testing framework suffers from coordination between MSO, ASTM International leadership, and Nevada legislators that circumvented normal regulatory processes. What MSO could not achieve through the Cannabis Compliance Board's science-based review on September 19, 2024, they achieved through legislative engineering and ASTM standards capture. MSO successfully maneuvered the legislature into outsourcing Nevada law to their own employee.

The economic costs of implementing proper sampling are substantial but pale in comparison to the costs of continued inadequate testing: contaminated products reaching consumers, false regulatory actions, laboratory accreditation failures, and catastrophic public health events. The cannabis industry must choose between the immediate costs of proper sampling and the devastating long-term costs of statistical inadequacy.

The Cannabis Compliance Board faces a critical choice: implement scientifically defensible requirements that actually protect public health, or continue the illusion of safety that industry wrote for itself. The statistical evidence is unambiguous—current requirements render testing meaningless. Nevada has an opportunity to lead by implementing the nation's first truly scientific cannabis testing program. The alternative—continuing with statistically invalid testing—is both scientifically indefensible and ethically and morally unacceptable.

Implementation will require substantial resources, extended timelines, and industry-wide commitment to scientific rigor. However, the alternative—continuing with statistically meaningless testing—is both scientifically indefensible and ethically unacceptable. Nevada must lead by implementing the first truly scientific cannabis testing program in the United States.

## **Technical Appendix A: Statistical Methodology and Calculations**

### **A.1 Detection Probability Calculations Using Binomial Distribution**

#### **A.1.1 Theoretical Foundation**

The probability of detecting contamination in a lot follows the binomial distribution, which is the standard statistical method for acceptance sampling in food safety and quality control. The basic formula is:

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - p)^n$$

Where:

- $p$  = proportion of the lot that is contaminated



- $n$  = effective number of independent sampling units

### A.1.2 Calculating Effective Sample Size ( $n$ )

The critical parameter requiring explanation is " $n$ " - the effective number of independent sampling units. This depends on both the sample size and the degree of homogenization:

For properly homogenized samples:  $n = (\text{Homogenized Sample Weight}) / (\text{Minimum Detectable Unit Size})$

For cannabis testing, assuming a minimum detectable unit of approximately 1 gram (based on typical analytical subsample sizes):

- 20g properly homogenized sample:  $n \approx 20$  independent units
- 60g properly homogenized sample:  $n \approx 60$  independent units

However, for inadequately homogenized samples, the effective  $n$  is dramatically reduced because the material consists of heterogeneous "clumps" rather than thoroughly mixed particles:

- 20g collected but poorly mixed:  $n \approx 2-4$  independent clumps
- 60g collected but poorly mixed:  $n \approx 5-10$  independent clumps

### A.1.3 Worked Example: 5% Contamination Detection

Scenario: A 15-pound (6,804g) cannabis lot contains localized contamination affecting 5% of the material.

Case 1: Current Practice (20g collected, inadequate homogenization)

Effective  $n \approx 2.5$  independent clumps (due to poor mixing)

- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - 0.05)^{2.5}$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (0.95)^{2.5}$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - 0.8789$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 0.121$  or 12%

Case 2: Proper Practice (60g properly homogenized)

Effective  $n \approx 7.5$  well-mixed units (assuming even with good homogenization, some spatial correlation remains)

- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - 0.05)^{7.5}$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (0.95)^{7.5}$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - 0.6920$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 0.308$  or 31%

Case 3: Ideal homogenization (60 fully independent units)

- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - 0.05)^{60}$

- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (0.95)^{60}$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - 0.0458$
- $P(\text{detection}) = 0.954$  or 95%

#### A.1.4 Worked Example: 3% Contamination Detection

**Scenario:** A 15-pound (6,804g) cannabis lot contains localized contamination affecting 3% of the material.

##### Case 1: Current Practice (20g collected, inadequate homogenization)

Effective  $n \approx 3$  independent clumps (due to poor mixing)

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - 0.03)^3$$

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (0.97)^3$$

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - 0.9127$$

$$P(\text{detection}) = 0.087 \text{ or } 9\%$$

##### Case 2: Proper Practice (60g properly homogenized)

Effective  $n \approx 7.5$  well-mixed units (assuming even with good homogenization, some spatial correlation remains)

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - 0.03)^{7.5}$$

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (0.97)^{7.5}$$

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - 0.7941$$

$$P(\text{detection}) = 0.206 \text{ or } 21\%$$

#### Statistical Assumptions and Calculations:

- The effective number of independent samples ( $n_{\text{eff}}$ ) is reduced from the sample weight in grams due to inadequate homogenization creating correlated "clumps" rather than independent sampling units.
- For poorly mixed 20g samples,  $n_{\text{eff}} \approx 3$  represents approximately 3 independent clumps of material.
- For properly mixed 60g samples,  $n_{\text{eff}} \approx 7.5$  accounts for improved homogenization while recognizing that perfect independence is rarely achieved in practice.
- The failure rate is calculated as 1 minus the detection probability. For Current Practice with 9% detection, the failure rate is 91% ( $1 - 0.09 = 0.91$ ).

## A.2 Measurement Uncertainty Budget Development

### A.2.1 Theoretical Framework

Total measurement uncertainty is calculated using the root sum of squares (RSS) method mandated by ISO/IEC 17025:

$$U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(U_{\text{sampling}}^2 + U_{\text{homogenization}}^2 + U_{\text{analytical}}^2 + U_{\text{other}}^2)}$$

## A.2.2 Component Uncertainty Derivations

### A.2.2.1 Sampling Uncertainty ( $U_{\text{sampling}}$ )

Sampling uncertainty derives from fundamental sampling theory:

$$U_{\text{sampling}} = (CV / \sqrt{n}) \times 100\%$$

Where:

- CV = coefficient of variation of the lot (20% for cannabis)
- n = number of increments in the composite sample

For inadequate sampling:

- 20g from 15-lb lot (0.29% rate):  $n \approx 1.5$  increments
- $U_{\text{sampling}} = 20\% / \sqrt{1.5} \times 100\% = 16.3\%$

For the conservative estimate accounting for extreme heterogeneity:

- $U_{\text{sampling}} \approx 78\%$  (models  $n \approx 0.066$  effective increments, representing very poor sampling)

### A.2.2.2 Homogenization Uncertainty ( $U_{\text{homogenization}}$ )

Homogenization uncertainty depends on particle size distribution and mixing efficiency:

$$U_{\text{homogenization}} = CV_{\text{residual}} \times \sqrt{(1 - \text{mixing efficiency})}$$

For cannabis with 20% baseline CV:

- Poor homogenization (60% efficiency):  $U_{\text{homogenization}} = 20\% \times \sqrt{0.4} = 12.6\%$
- Very poor homogenization (10% efficiency):  $U_{\text{homogenization}} = 20\% \times \sqrt{0.9} = 19.0\%$

The estimate of 65% for inadequate practice suggests severe unmixing or <5% mixing efficiency.

### A.2.2.3 Analytical Uncertainty ( $U_{\text{analytical}}$ )

Typical for HPLC or GC methods. Components include:

- Instrument precision:  $\pm 3\text{-}5\%$
- Method repeatability:  $\pm 4\text{-}6\%$
- Calibration uncertainty:  $\pm 2\text{-}3\%$

$$\text{Combined: } U_{\text{analytical}} = \sqrt{(5^2 + 5^2 + 3^2)} = 7.4\%$$

The conservative estimate of 10% is reasonable.

### A.2.3 Worked Example: 15-Pound Lot Uncertainty Cascade

#### Assumptions for 15-Pound Lot Statistical Comparison Table:

- **Effective n (homogenization quality):** This parameter represents the effective number of independent sampling units after accounting for homogenization quality. For Current Flawed Practice with poor mixing of 20g samples,  $n \approx 2.5$  reflects the presence of correlated "clumps" rather than independent particles. For Required Scientific Practice with proper homogenization of 60g samples,  $n \approx 7.5$  accounts for improved mixing while recognizing that perfect independence is rarely achieved in practice.
- **Statistical confidence:** Calculated using the formula for confidence intervals with small sample sizes. Current Practice achieves only 51% confidence (below the 95% standard) due to inadequate sampling rate (0.29%) and poor homogenization. Required Scientific Practice achieves 95% confidence through proper sampling rate (0.88%) and homogenization.
- **Margin of error:** Derived from the coefficient of variation (CV) formula:  $MoE = CV / \sqrt{n_{eff}}$ . Assuming  $CV=20\%$  (typical for cannabis), Current Practice yields  $\pm 17.4\%$  margin of error ( $20\% / \sqrt{2.5}$ ), while Required Practice achieves  $\pm 5\%$  ( $20\% / \sqrt{7.5} \approx 20\% / 2.74$ ).
- **Detection probability:** Calculated using the binomial formula  $P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1-p)^{n_{eff}}$ . For 5% contamination with Current Practice:  $1 - (0.95)^{2.5} = 0.122 \approx 12\%$ . For Required Practice:  $1 - (0.95)^{7.5} = 0.308 \approx 31\%$ . Similar calculations apply to 10% contamination scenarios.
- **Statistical power:** Represents the probability of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis. Calculated for a two-sample proportion test with  $\alpha=0.05$  and effect size based on 20% absolute difference in detection rates. Current Practice achieves only 0.21 power (far below the 0.80 standard), while Required Practice achieves adequate 0.80 power.

Current Practice (20g homogenized from 15-lb lot):

- $U_{\text{sampling}} = 78\%$
- $U_{\text{homogenization}} = 65\%$
- $U_{\text{analytical}} = 10\%$
- $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(78^2 + 65^2 + 10^2)} = \sqrt{(6,084 + 4,225 + 100)} = \sqrt{10,409} = 102.0\%$

Interpretation: When measurement uncertainty exceeds 50%, results are scientifically unreliable per ISO/IEC 17025. At 102%, the measurement is essentially meaningless.

Proper Practice (60g homogenized from 15-lb lot):

- $U_{\text{sampling}} = 15\%$
- $U_{\text{homogenization}} = 8\%$
- $U_{\text{analytical}} = 10\%$
- $U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(15^2 + 8^2 + 10^2)} = \sqrt{(225 + 64 + 100)} = \sqrt{389} = 19.7\%$

This is within acceptable limits for regulatory testing.

## **MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX**

This appendix provides the fundamental mathematical formulas used throughout the analysis.

RSS Uncertainty Formula

$$U_{\text{total}} = \sqrt{(U_{\text{sampling}}^2 + U_{\text{homogenization}}^2 + U_{\text{analytical}}^2)}$$

Binomial Detection Probability

$$P(\text{detection}) = 1 - (1 - p)^n$$

Where  $p$  = proportion contaminated and  $n$  = effective sampling units.

Solving for  $n$

$$n = \ln(1 - P) / \ln(1 - p)$$

Uncertainty to Reporting Range Conversion

$$\text{Absolute uncertainty} = (U/100) \times \text{True\_Value}$$

Standard uncertainty ( $k=1$ , ~68% confidence):

$$\text{Measured\_Value} \pm \text{Absolute\_uncertainty}$$

Expanded uncertainty ( $k=2$ , ~95% confidence):

$$\text{Measured\_Value} \pm (2 \times \text{Absolute\_uncertainty})$$

Example: For  $U_{\text{total}} = 102\%$  at 20% THC: Range = -0.4% to 40.4%

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## Public Comment on Nevada's Cannabis Product Symbol

December 8, 2025

To Whom It May Concern:

As follow up to my recent communication with Karalin Cronkhite, and on behalf of [Doctors for Drug Policy Reform \(D4DPR\)](#), I wish to submit this public comment to the Cannabis Compliance Board in support of Nevada's adoption of the International Intoxicating Cannabinoid Product Symbol (IICPS).

The IICPS is a standardized, universal symbol for use on any products containing intoxicating cannabinoids. It was vetted and approved as ASTM Consensus Standard [D8441](#) through ASTM International's rigorous accredited consensus process. The standard was adopted following a unanimous vote by over 200 experts representing government, industry, academia, and public health. During its development, the symbol underwent consumer comprehension research to evaluate clarity, recognizability, and communication of risk, ensuring it met the functional and design requirements for real-world use. The IICPS is endorsed by all categories of cannabis stakeholders — industry trade groups, physicians, patients, consumers, and advocacy organizations.

The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act ([NTTAA](#)) mandates use of consensus standards in federal regulations, so the IICPS is poised to become the national symbol for cannabis and intoxicating hemp products when such products are regulated by the U.S. federal government.

Since its introduction in 2022, the IICPS has already been incorporated into the universal symbol of eight U.S. states: Delaware, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia. As of January 1st, Oregon will adopt the IICPS for use on intoxicating hemp products. That makes the IICPS the most widely adopted intoxicating cannabinoid product symbol in the United States, more than twice that of any other symbol.

I understand that the CCB has two priorities for the form and function of Nevada's cannabis product symbol:

1. It must be designed so that it can be embossed on edible cannabis products.
2. It must differentiate the packages of Nevada cannabis products from those that come from outside the state, so authorities can track the movement of products across Nevada's borders.


New Jersey, Delaware, and Vermont already mandate the embossing of cannabis edibles with the IICPS, as seen in the illustration to the right.

### Edibles embossed with IICPS





The IICPS was designed to accommodate text below or adjacent to the symbol to enable authorities having jurisdiction to satisfy regulatory requirements. As shown in the illustration below, current usage of the IICPS includes text for five of the nine states who adopted it.



\*For use on hemp products starting Jan 1, 2026

As you can see, the State of Delaware included “DE” below their symbol, to allow easy differentiation between their cannabis products and those of other states. Likewise, the Nevada CCB can customize the IICPS to suit the state’s needs, with text and even a silhouette of the state map. The illustration below shows several concepts for customization. The Nevada CCB can use one of these or any other text options, for free and in perpetuity, as long as there is no modification of the IICPS itself.



I’ve attached two additional documents for your review:

1. An IICPS infographic
2. A letter signed by 22 stakeholder organizations supporting universal adoption of the IICPS

States can easily transition to the use of the IICPS, and Vermont’s example is one the CCB could follow. They recently replaced their bespoke symbol with the IICPS with a long (12 month) runway for manufacturers to use up existing packaging inventories with the old symbol. I’m sure your decision to make the transition to an increasingly accepted standard would meet with the same support of cannabis businesses that Vermont has enjoyed.

Thank you for your time and consideration of the CCB’s adoption of the IICPS. Please contact me with any questions.

Respectfully Submitted,

David L. Nathan, MD, DFAPA  
Co-founder & Past President  
Member, Board of Directors

**DOCTORS FOR DRUG POLICY REFORM**


(609) 688-0400 (office) | [D4DPR.org](http://D4DPR.org) | [dnathan@d4dpr.org](mailto:dnathan@d4dpr.org)

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# What is the International Intoxicating Cannabinoid Product Symbol (IICPS)?

- 1** Combines familiar graphical elements into a symbol that may be used free of charge, as long as the symbol itself is not modified




- 2** Colors are key



Yellow outline added when used on dark backgrounds

- 3** Simple design clear when embossed on edibles or printed at reduced sizes



Approved as an international consensus standard: **ASTM D8441**

- 4** Regulators can require text to be printed below or adjacent to the symbol



**Q:** Why isn't "THC" included **inside** the IICPS?

- A. Graphical symbols are better for children and adults who may lack specific literacy, culture, or education
- B. THC isn't the only intoxicating cannabinoid (e.g., HHC)
- C. International standards prohibit alphanumeric characters inside safety symbols
- D. The IICPS stays the same when text needs to be revised
- E. All of the above

- 6** Endorsed by a coalition of drug policy, clinician, patient, regulator, and industry organizations



**7**

Already in use on products and packages around the United States of America



## **STAKEHOLDER ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORT UNIVERSAL ADOPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTOXICATING CANNABINOID PRODUCT SYMBOL (IICPS)**

To cannabis regulators in the United States and around the world:

We, the undersigned organizations representing public health, social justice, patient, consumer, and industry advocacy groups, wish to declare our strong support for the adoption of the International Intoxicating Cannabinoid Product Symbol (IICPS) by all authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) in the United States and abroad. The IICPS is defined by the international consensus standard ASTM D8441.<sup>1,2</sup>



***Figure 1:** The IICPS for light and dark backgrounds, printed on a Montana package, and embossed on a Vermont edible*

### **The importance of a standardized, universal cannabis product symbol**

To prevent accidental ingestion by adults and (especially) children, cannabis product packages should bear a symbol that enables people of all ages and backgrounds to identify intoxicating cannabinoids with a quick glance at a product package. To facilitate recognition and promote future interstate commerce, a well-designed cannabis product symbol should be harmonized across regional, state, and national borders, transcending language and culture.

A truly universal cannabis product symbol is a simple and highly visible indicator of whether cannabis regulators are employing best practices to protect public health and safety.

### **Consensus standards for safety signs**

The IICPS is based upon existing consensus standards, which are technical specifications issued by standards development organizations like NIST, UL, ASTM, and ISO. They are developed in an open environment to ensure public safety and promote best practices through collaboration by professionals from both the public and private sectors.

Recognizing the importance of well-designed industry standards, the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) requires the U.S. federal government to adopt available consensus standards in federal regulations. If a federal entity seeks an exemption from the NTTAA, the head of that

<sup>1</sup> ASTM D8441/D8441M, Standard Specification for International Symbol for Identifying Consumer Products Containing Intoxicating Cannabinoids. ASTM International: Approved February 25, 2022. [https://www.astm.org/d8441\\_d8441m-22.html](https://www.astm.org/d8441_d8441m-22.html)

<sup>2</sup> Wikipedia. "ASTM D8441/D8441M," Accessed April 27, 2023. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASTM\\_D8441/D8441M](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASTM_D8441/D8441M)

agency or department must provide a written explanation for non-compliance to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This legislation put into law what had long been considered best practice.

The bedrock consensus standard for safety signs, originally published in 1984, is ISO 3864,<sup>3</sup> which requires that a standard warning sign include a black graphical element within a black-bordered yellow triangle (see **Figure 2** for examples).<sup>4</sup> ISO 3864 corresponds to the harmonized U.S. consensus standard ANSI Z535, which defines “warning sign yellow” as Pantone 109c (Hex: #ffd100; RGB: 255,209,0; CMYK: 0,18,100,0).<sup>5</sup>

ISO 3864-3 specifies that the graphical element inside a warning symbol should:

- Utilize objects, concepts, and activities, or a combination of these, which are familiar to the target group
- Contain only those details that contribute to an understanding of the symbol
- Exclude any alphanumeric characters or punctuation
- Be readily associated with its intended meaning
- Be easily distinguishable from other graphical elements<sup>6</sup>

For cannabis products, the only graphical element that satisfies these criteria is a cannabis leaf. It is far and away the most familiar graphical element associated with cannabis. Alphanumeric characters (e.g., “THC” or “21+”) and punctuation marks (e.g., an exclamation point) are prohibited in ISO 3864 compliant symbols, the sole exception being the basic warning sign with an exclamation point, which is defined in a separate standard.<sup>7</sup> The reason for this exclusion is rooted in principles of social justice: **Safety symbols that include text within the symbol discriminate against already marginalized communities on the basis of age, culture, language, literacy, knowledge of the Latin alphabet, and education.**



**Figure 2:** Examples of ISO 3864 compliant signs in use around the United States

Further, the inclusion of “THC” within the symbol itself erroneously implies that THC is the only intoxicating cannabinoid. While currently unregulated, there are products containing other cannabinoids, such as hexahydrocannabinol (HHC),<sup>8</sup> which are themselves intoxicating. Such products will likely merit labeling with the cannabis product symbol in the future, even if those products do not contain THC. Thus, any symbol with the text “THC” within the symbol will need to be abandoned.

<sup>3</sup> ISO 3864-1:2011, *Graphical symbols—Safety colours and safety signs—Design principles for safety signs and safety markings*. International Organization for Standardization: Second edition, 2011-04-15. <https://www.iso.org/standard/51021.html>

<sup>4</sup> ISO 3864-2:2016, *Graphical symbols—Safety colours and safety signs—Design principles for product safety labels*. International Organization for Standardization: Second edition, 2016-12-15. <https://www.iso.org/standard/66836.html>

<sup>5</sup> ANSI Z535.1-2017, *American National Standard for Safety Colors*. American National Standards Institute, Inc. (Secretariat: National Electrical Manufacturers Association): Approved October 20, 2017. [https://www.nema.org/docs/default-source/standards-document-library/ansi-z535\\_1-2017-contents-and-scope.pdf?sfvrsn=d7266ce\\_2](https://www.nema.org/docs/default-source/standards-document-library/ansi-z535_1-2017-contents-and-scope.pdf?sfvrsn=d7266ce_2)

<sup>6</sup> ISO 3864-3:2012(en), *Graphical symbols—Safety colours and safety signs—Design principles for graphical symbols for use in safety signs*. International Organization for Standardization: Second edition, 2012-02-01; Corrected version 2012-06-15. <https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:3864:-3:ed-2:v2:en>

<sup>7</sup> ISO 7010:2019, *Graphical symbols—Safety colours and safety signs—Registered Safety Signs*. International Organization for Standardization: Third edition, 2019-07; Corrected version 2020-06. <https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:7010:ed-3:v2:en>

<sup>8</sup> European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. “EMCDDA technical expert meeting on hexahydrocannabinol (HHC) and related Cannabinoids.” Lisbon: December 19, 2022. [https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/news/2022/emcdda-technical-expert-meeting-hexahydrocannabinol-hhc-and-related-cannabinoids\\_en](https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/news/2022/emcdda-technical-expert-meeting-hexahydrocannabinol-hhc-and-related-cannabinoids_en)



Despite the ubiquity of ISO 3864 safety signs, no state regulatory body utilized that international standard until Montana adopted the IICPS in late 2021. Prior to this, individual U.S. states created their own bespoke and ironically named “universal” symbols. See **Figure 3** for a comparison of cannabis product symbols.

## Development of the IICPS and ASTM D8441

The International Intoxicating Cannabinoid Product Symbol (IICPS) was developed by Doctors for Drug Policy Reform (D4DPR, formerly Doctors for Cannabis Regulation) and ASTM International.<sup>9</sup>

When designing a truly universal cannabis product symbol, the creators met and exceeded the requirements of safety sign standards, satisfying a strict set of criteria:

- Communicate a simple public health message: “Caution with Cannabis”
- Use the simplest possible design to fit within the allotted space, so that everyone – especially the visually impaired – will immediately ascertain the meaning of the symbol
- Incorporate symbology that transcends age, language, culture, literacy, knowledge of the Latin alphabet, and specialized knowledge about cannabis
- Accommodate the addition of optional text below or next to the symbol to comply with existing consensus standards and meet the needs of authorities having jurisdiction
- Limit printing/package costs by using only two colors (inclusive of black and white)
- Avoid package inventory waste by reducing the chance that the symbol would need to be replaced as a result of future changes in science or public policy
- Facilitate recognition at reduced sizes and low resolution, which is critical for printing on small packages and printing or embossing directly onto the surface of intoxicating cannabis products
- Permit use of the symbol free of charge by all legalized jurisdictions in the United States

The IICPS was approved as a standalone consensus standard by ASTM International’s Committee D37 on Cannabis.<sup>10</sup> It passed by a unanimous vote of over 200 members on its first ballot in early 2022. As the first cannabis labeling consensus standard in the world, it now bears the official designation of ASTM D8441.

As specified by ISO 3864 and ASTM D8441, the IICPS is designed to accommodate alphanumeric or special characters below or next to the symbol for supplemental information. This allows for use of an unchanging, universal symbol while meeting the varying needs of authorities having jurisdiction in the United States and around the world. It also obviates any perceived need for the inclusion of letters, numbers, or special characters inside the symbol itself.

Montana was the first U.S. state to adopt the IICPS in late 2021.<sup>11</sup> Since then, New Jersey,<sup>12</sup> Vermont,<sup>13</sup> and South Dakota<sup>14</sup> have incorporated the IICPS design into their state symbols. Other states, including Alaska,<sup>15</sup> are considering adoption of the IICPS. See **Figure 4** for examples of the IICPS in current usage.

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<sup>9</sup> Doctors for Drug Policy Reform. “Universal Cannabis Symbol.” D4DPR website. Accessed April 27, 2023. <https://www.d4dpr.org/universal-cannabis-symbol>

<sup>10</sup> ASTM International. “New Standard Provides International Symbol for Intoxicating Cannabinoids.” ASTM International News Release, March 15, 2022. <https://newsroom.astm.org/new-standard-provides-international-symbol-intoxicating-cannabinoids>















<sup>11</sup> Montana Department of Revenue, General Labeling Requirements, accessed April 27, 2023. <https://mtrevenue.gov/cannabis/labeling-and-packaging/>

<sup>12</sup> New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory Commission, Business Resources, accessed April 27, 2023. <https://www.nj.gov/cannabis/businesses/resources/>

<sup>13</sup> Vermont Cannabis Control Board, Rule 2: Regulation of Cannabis Establishments, November 2021. <https://ccb.vermont.gov/sites/ccb/files/2021-11/Proposed%20Rule%20-%20Regulation%20of%20Cannabis%20Establishments.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Medical Cannabis in South Dakota: Standard Cannabis Product Symbol, accessed April 27, 2023. <https://medcannabis.sd.gov/Establishments/Symbol.aspx>

<sup>15</sup> Helms, Rick & Sawyer, Jane. “Summary of the Special Working Group on Drinkables.” *State of Alaska, Alcohol & Marijuana Control Office*. January 13, 2022. <https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/9/pub/MCB/Minutes/2022/01.19/Tab5.pdf?>

Symbol design	Authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) using the symbol	Shape of outline (conventional meaning)	Emphasized color (conventional meaning)	Number of colors (including white)	Graphical element (cannabis leaf)	Large graphical element for the visually impaired	Text excluded from interior of symbol	ISO & ANSI compliant
	IICPS: MT, NJ, SD, & VT	Triangle (warning)	Yellow (caution)	2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	AR	None	None	2	No	No	No	No
	AZ, CO, FL, & OH	Diamond (none)	Red (prohibition)	2	No	No	No	No
	CA	Triangle (warning)	None	2	Yes	No	No	No
	CT, MA, ME, & RI	Triangle (warning)	Red (prohibition)	3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	MD	Triangle (warning)	Red (prohibition)	2	Yes	No	No	No
	MI	Inverted triangle (none)	Green (safe condition)	2	Yes	Yes	No	No
	NM	Diamond (none)	Red (prohibition)	2	No	No	No	No
	NV	Triangle (warning)	None	2	No	No	No	No
	NY	Square (none)	Yellow, red (caution, prohibition)	4	Yes	No	No	No
	OK	Rectangle (none)	Red (prohibition)	3	Yes	No	No	No
	OR	Rectangle (none)	Red (prohibition)	3	Yes	Yes	No	No
	WA	Diamond (none)	Yellow, green (caution, safe condition)	4	Yes	Yes	No	No
	Canada	Octagon (stop)	Red (prohibition)	3	Yes	Yes	No	No

**Figure 3: Comparison of cannabis product symbols in use, May 2023.** Green indicates desirable attributes (according to international consensus standards), while red indicates undesirable attributes. Multiple consensus standards dictate that the shape of a safety sign urging caution should be a warning triangle. The emphasized color of a symbol should be consistent with existing conventions, in which red denotes prohibition, yellow denotes caution, and green denotes a safe condition. The ideal number of colors in a safety symbol is two (and white is considered a color in this context), as more colors unnecessarily increase the cost of packaging. Standard safety signs contain only graphical elements within their borders, not text or punctuation. Only large design elements should be included. Finally, safety signs should be compliant with ISO and ANSI consensus standards, as described in the text.

In early 2023, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a report on driving under the influence of cannabis and other drugs, in which they referenced the IICPS as an existing consensus standard.<sup>16</sup> To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a cannabis product symbol has been recognized by a U.S. federal agency.

As part of its ongoing commitment to public health and safety through the effective regulation of cannabis, **D4DPR commits to making these designs available in multiple file formats for use by regulators in all U.S. states, U.S. territories, and the U.S. federal government at no cost, royalty-free, and without restriction, in perpetuity.**



**Figure 4:** IICPS on actual product packages and embossed on lozenges

## Conclusion

We endorse the IICPS to promote public health and safety by differentiating products containing intoxicating cannabis from other products. It serves disadvantaged communities by ensuring correct identification by people of any age, culture, literacy level, or education by following the international convention of using graphical elements rather than alphanumeric characters in the design. Finally, it empowers every authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) to add supplemental text in a way that meets their constituents' needs. AHJs can easily change supplemental text in the future without needing to modify the symbol itself.

**We, the undersigned organizations, urge all cannabis regulatory bodies worldwide to adopt the IICPS as a mandated “universal symbol” to be printed on all intoxicating cannabis product packages. This action will demonstrate regulators’ commitment to public health and safety, standardized labeling, and existing consensus standards, with the prescience and flexibility to anticipate future changes in the nascent regulated cannabis industry.**

Respectfully,

[See Signatories on following pages]

<sup>16</sup> National Transportation Safety Board. “Alcohol, Other Drug, and Multiple Drug Use Among Drivers.” *Safety Research Report SRR 22-02*. December 13, 2022. p. 66. <https://www.nts.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SRR2202.pdf>

## Signatories to Open Letter from Stakeholder Organizations Supporting Adoption of the IICPS

 Americans for  
Safe Access  
[safeaccessnow.org](https://safeaccessnow.org)



[attach.org](https://attach.org)



**ACHEM**

Association for Cannabis Health Equity and Medicine

[achemed.org](https://achemed.org)



[crc-coalition.org](https://crc-coalition.org)



**CLERGY FOR A NEW DRUG POLICY**

[newdrugpolicy.org](https://newdrugpolicy.org)



Council For  
Federal Cannabis Regulation [uscfr.org](https://uscfr.org)

[d4dpr.org](https://d4dpr.org)



**Doctors for  
Drug Policy  
Reform**



[gacc.io](https://gacc.io)

Global Alliance for  
Cannabis Commerce

**We are  
the Drug  
Policy  
Alliance.**



[immdefense.org](https://immdefense.org)



**ICANNA**  
International Institute for Cannabinoids

[drugpolicy.org](https://drugpolicy.org)

[www.institut-icanna.com/en/](https://www.institut-icanna.com/en/)

JustLeadershipUSA  
[jlusa.org](https://jlusa.org)



**JLUSA**

The **JUSTÜS** Foundation



[justus.foundation](https://justus.foundation)



[mpp.org](https://mpp.org)



[minorities4medicalmarijuana.org](https://minorities4medicalmarijuana.org)



[thecannabisindustry.org](https://thecannabisindustry.org)

**NORML**

National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws

[Norml.org](https://Norml.org)



**Parabola  
Center**

[parabolacenter.com](https://parabolacenter.com)



**SOCIETY OF CANNABIS  
— CLINICIANS —**

[www.cannabisclinicians.org](https://www.cannabisclinicians.org)

**ssdp**

Students for  
Sensible  
Drug Policy

[ssdp.org](https://ssdp.org)



[veteranscannacoalition.org](https://veteranscannacoalition.org)

**UNLOC INC.**

Unified Legacy Operators Council

[unlocnow.org](https://unlocnow.org)



**Signatories to Open Letter from Stakeholder Organizations  
Supporting Adoption of the IICPS**  
*(Alphabetical list)*

Americans for Safe Access (ASA, [safeaccessnow.org](https://safeaccessnow.org))

American Trade Association for Cannabis and Hemp (ATACH, [attach.org](https://attach.org))

Association for Cannabis Health Equity and Medicine (ACHEM, [achemed.org](https://achemed.org))

Cannabis Regulators of Color Coalition (CRCC, [crc-coalition.org](https://crc-coalition.org))

Clergy for a New Drug Policy (CNDP, [newdrugpolicy.org](https://newdrugpolicy.org))

Council for Federal Cannabis Regulation (CFCR, [uscfc.org](https://uscfc.org))

Doctors for Drug Policy Reform (*formerly Doctors for Cannabis Regulation*,  
D4DPR, [d4dpr.org](https://d4dpr.org))

Drug Policy Alliance (DPA, [drugpolicy.org](https://drugpolicy.org))

Global Alliance for Cannabis Commerce (GACC, [gacc.io](https://gacc.io))

Immigrant Defense Project (IDP, [immdefense.org](https://immdefense.org))

International Institute for Cannabinoids (ICANNA, [www.institut-icanna.com/en/](https://www.institut-icanna.com/en/))

JustLeadershipUSA (JLUSA, [jlusa.org](https://jlusa.org))

JUSTÜS Foundation ([justus.foundation](https://justus.foundation))

Marijuana Policy Project (MPP, [mpp.org](https://mpp.org))

Minorities for Medical Marijuana (M4MM, [minorities4medicalmarijuana.org](https://minorities4medicalmarijuana.org))

National Cannabis Industry Association (NCIA, [thecannabisindustry.org](https://thecannabisindustry.org))

National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML, [norml.org](https://norml.org))

Parabola Center for Law and Policy ([parabolacenter.com](https://parabolacenter.com))

Society of Cannabis Clinicians (SCC, [www.cannabisclinicians.org](https://www.cannabisclinicians.org))

Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP, [ssdp.org](https://ssdp.org))

Unified Legacy Operators Council (UNLOC INC., [unlocnow.org](https://unlocnow.org))

Veterans Cannabis Coalition (VCC, [veteranscannacoalition.org](https://veteranscannacoalition.org))

**PLEASE DIRECT ALL INQUIRIES TO: [LABELING@D4DPR.ORG](mailto:LABELING@D4DPR.ORG)**